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EXPLAINING “BAIT-AND-SWITCH” REGULATION
DAVID ADAM FRIEDMAN*
ABSTRACT
“Bait and switch” can describe a range of commercial behaviors common in the everyday marketplace, but virtually ignored in the academic
literature. The traditional definition of unlawful bait and switch applies to
insincere offers to sell one item in order to induce the buyer to purchase
another. Certain sellers have historically employed bait-and-switch tactics,
including urban retailers, aluminum siding companies, and supermarkets.
Colloquially, this definition can also cover lawful or other borderline
sales tactics, including the use of teaser rates or low introductory pricing,
or even “free offers.” Even common lawful tactics, like the deliberate routing
of customers past other retail displays on their way to purchase high-volume
or featured items, may involve “bait” to induce other purchases.
Why are some of these behaviors lawful and others unlawful? In this
Article, I examine several different flavors of bait-and-switch tactics, exploring the underlying behaviors behind the tactics and the welfare implications of regulating them. Looking to the literature on commercial custom
and norms, I find a pattern showing that bait-and-switch practices that align
with custom and norms tend to be lawful, and those that do not tend to be
unlawful. Welfare advancement seemingly plays a distant secondary role in
explaining bait-and-switch regulation.
My finding should compel regulators to consider whether the goal of
elevating the market atmosphere by banning offensive behavior should trump
welfare concerns. Further, my conclusion can also help advocates shape
more effective arguments for adjusting trade practice regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
On the Golden Gate [University School of Law] campus recently, a
group of first-year students at risk of losing their [merit] scholarships
were trying to make sense of the system .... [T]he phrase “bait and
switch” came up a lot. Several assumed that they were given what is essentially a discount to get them in the door.
“I had a friend once who told me that hunting is a sport,” said one
Golden Gate merit grant winner who anticipated coming up shy of a 3.0
average. “I said, ‘Hunting is not a sport.’ He said: ‘Sure it’s a sport. It’s
just that the animals don’t know they’re in a game.’ That’s what it feels
like to be a law student these days. You have no idea you’re in a game.”1

When do bait-and-switch tactics cross the line from “fair sport” to “turkey shoot”? A range of bait-and-switch tactics emerge in the marketplace.
Some have been deemed lawful fair sport, and others have been deemed unlawful “turkey shoots.” Extending the metaphor, the formal hunting rules
appear to reflect a sense of norms and imbued marketplace customs. Just as
real hunting rules are driven by custom, norms, and formal regulation, so
are rules about sales tactics. In this Article, I find that custom and norms2
1

David Segal, Behind the Curve: How Law Students Lose the Grant Game, and How
Their Schools Win, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at BU1 (emphasis added). Just over one
year after this New York Times article appeared, the American Bar Association House of
Delegates promulgated a disclosure requirement for conditional scholarships at law schools.
See Debra Cassens Weiss, No Fudging: Revised Standard Bars Law Schools from
Publishing Misleading Consumer Info, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 6, 2012, 10:46 AM), http://www
.abajournal.com/news/article/no_fudging_revised_standard_bars_law_schools_from_pub
lishing_misleadin/; 2012–2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL
OF LAW SCHOOLS 39, Standard 509(e) (2012) [hereinafter Standard 509(e)]. Part III.C.2
discusses this standard in detail.
2
In Roman law, custom was defined as “a repeat behavior to which the relevant
majority of the community had tacitly consented to be bound to perform.” Emily Kadens,
The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1163 (2012). See
generally id. at 1163–67 (discussing the evolving historical definitions of commercial
custom). Richard Posner defines norms as “rule[s] that [are] neither promulgated by an
official source, such as a court or a legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal
sanctions, yet [are] regularly complied with,” like rules of etiquette. Richard A. Posner,
Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 365
(1997). For a compendium of articles about the role and influence of social norms, see
generally ERIC A. POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW (2007)
[hereinafter POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS]. I often use the terms “customs” and “norms”
interchangeably because they all work together to guide formal approaches toward
regulation in this area. There are obviously significant distinctions between custom and
norms, but for the purpose of this Article, the distinctions matter less. I observe that
however defined, tradition and mores, as embedded in custom and norms, collectively
explain which bait-and-switch-like tactics are deemed unlawful. Custom and norms are
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drive the approach toward formal regulation of bait-and-switch tactics more
than welfare advancement.3 The cultural explanation of commercial regulation can be identified in the history of commercial regulation4 and, I will
argue, can be used to explain current regulation and to predict and guide its
future. I use bait and switch to illustrate these dynamics.
Though custom and norms tend to explain our regulatory regime more
closely than the construct of welfare advancement,5 this phenomenon might
not always lead to the most desirable social result. Reinforcement of norms
may correspond with notions of fairness, which may diverge from welfare
advancement. 6 This is not to say that reinforcing custom comes without
benefits. A triumph of custom may vindicate the idea that certain rules are
worth the welfare price because they elevate the morality and the fairness of
the marketplace.7
In the consumer environment, persuasive and creative sales tactics are
perpetually invented and deployed, and regulators are left to discern which
often discussed and distinguished together, but they both influence commercial culture.
See Kadens, supra note 2, at 1166–67 & n.36. H.L.A. Hart noted the reality that “custom
is law only if it is one of a class of customs which is ‘recognized’ as law by a particular
legal system.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 44–45 (2d ed. 1994); see also K.N.
LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW
IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 275 (William S. Hein & Co., 2002) (1941) (noting that
customs and mores “fuse and confuse the notion of ‘practice’ (... actual behavior) with
the notion of ‘standard’ (... an ideal of ... the proper line of actual behavior)”). Again, I
acknowledge this confusion identified by Llewellyn, but put it aside for the purposes of
this Article. I embrace the general notion that customs, mores, and norms all, in their own
way, guide the formalization of our approach toward bait and switch.
3
For the foundational, classic principles of welfare economics, see generally PAUL
ANTHONY SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 203–53 (1947).
4
For a discussion of the role of custom and norms in the drafting of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, see infra Part II.A.1.
5
The very limited economic literature evaluating the regulation of bait and switch provides thin guidance about the welfare impact, though, as I discuss in Part I.B, the weight
of the conjecture leads to a tentative conclusion that regulation should advance welfare in
the traditional scenario. For the literature on point, compare Eitan Gerstner & James D.
Hess, Can Bait and Switch Benefit Consumers?, 9 MARKETING SCI. 114, 114 (1990) [hereinafter Gerstner & Hess I], with William L. Wilkie et al., Does “Bait and Switch” Really
Benefit Consumers?, 17 MARKETING SCI. 273, 273–74 (1998) [hereinafter Wilkie et al.
I]. In reply to Wilkie et al. I, see James D. Hess & Eitan Gerstner, Yes, “Bait and Switch”
Really Benefits Consumers, 17 MARKETING SCI. 283, 283–84 (1998) [hereinafter Hess &
Gerstner II], and in reply to Hess & Gerstner, II, see William L. Wilkie et al., Does “Bait
and Switch” Really Benefit Consumers? Advancing the Discussion ..., 17 MARKETING
SCI. 290, 290–91 (1998) [hereinafter Wilkie et al. II].
6
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
1035 (2001).
7
See id. at 1035–38.
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tactics are deceptive. Choosing where and when to regulate common market activities can have a large impact. Consumer transactions are the fundamental lifeblood of the economy and, in aggregate, advance welfare.8
Government claims the responsibility of promoting the flow of accurate
information “without unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”9 Bait
and switch plays a significant role in the market, but the legal literature
ignores not just the tactic, but what can be learned from examining it.
Of course, with bait and switch, definition of the tactic presents a critical
starting point. Bait and switch is frequently used to describe a range of commercial behaviors, only some of which meet the legal criteria for deception
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).10 For the
purposes of this Article, I expand the scope of the term “bait and switch”
beyond the legal definition to include scenarios where consumers are lured
in with a low-price introductory offer and are later locked in to paying a potentially higher price for the same offer.11 Some of these tactics are omnipresent and lawful, but others have been designated unlawful by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC),12 by federal statute,13 by state regulation,14 and
are also held in disfavor by common law doctrines.15
The aforementioned “hunted” scholarship students at Golden Gate embraced “bait-and-switch” terminology.16 They felt like they had bought an
8

See generally SAMUELSON, supra note 3, at 203–53.
The Federal Trade Commission declares these goals within its mission and vision.
About the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 5, 2012), http://
www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm.
10
See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
11
Examples of these include “free offers,” credit card rate hikes, and, for the sake of
argument, law school merit scholarships, discussed infra Part III.C.
12
See Guides Against Bait Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 238 (2012). I focus primarily on
distinctions made by the FTC, examining the tactics that it has deemed unlawful through
Guidelines and civil actions.
13
See, e.g., Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734, 1735–36, 1738 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
14
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2012); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW
§ 396.1 (McKinney 2012); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(9)–(10) (West 2012).
15
Such doctrines include fraud, unconscionability, and unilateral mistake. See infra
notes 39–42.
16
The Golden Gate students’ bait-and-switch label went “viral.” See, e.g., Debra Cassens
Weiss, Bait and Switch? Law Schools Gain in US News with Merit Scholarships Conditioned
on High Grades, A.B.A. J. (May 2, 2011, 7:34 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news
/article/bait_and_switch_law_schools_gain_in_us_news_with_merit_scholarships_conditi/;
Nathan Koppel, Are Law Schools Deceiving Students by Offering Merit Scholarships?,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (May 2, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/05/02/are
-law-school-deceiving-students-by-offering-merit-scholarships/ (“Students accuse some schools
of a bait and switch ....”).
9
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offering at a low price only to be switched to a higher price, but they were
not really alleging the deployment of a traditional bait-and-switch tactic.
The FTC defines “bait” as
an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or service which the
advertiser in truth does not intend or want to sell. Its purpose is to switch
consumers from buying the advertised merchandise, in order to sell
something else, usually at a higher price or on a basis more advantageous
to the advertiser.17

These students,18 as I will discuss, may have been “allured,” but they were
not “switched.”
My definition of bait and switch includes the FTC definition, but expands it to apply to a range of tactics that offend general marketplace sensibilities. I discuss a number of these tactics, including a hypothetical of an
auto dealer advertising a car just to lure customers to the lot,19 the real case
of a retailer that frequently promoted a special offering to drive store traffic
but rarely actually sold it on those terms,20 and the company that required
in-home salespersons to disparage big-ticket promoted goods to encourage
the sale of higher-margin goods.21
Although they may not be explicitly labeled as such in a legal context,
other forms of bait and switch exist, are regulated differently, and evoke
different market customs. For example, “free offers” lure the attention of
consumers to a packaged promotion. The FTC requires a free offeror to disclose conspicuously why an offer is not truly “free.”22 That is, after luring
attention to an advertisement, the offeror presents the entirety of the sales
story. This presents the market with a different sort of “switch,” a lawful
switch, but a bait and switch nonetheless. Despite constituting a form of bait
and switch, courts and regulators have been unwilling to eschew this old
and established custom, though a plain look at free offers reveals that they
interfere with consumer cognition. Stronger regulation that departs from the
custom might conceivably advance welfare.23
17

Guides Against Bait Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 238.0 (2012).
Again, in 2011, these students transacted without disclosures mandated by ABA Standard 509(e).
19
See infra Part I.B.1.
20
See infra Part III.A.3.
21
See infra Part III.A.2.
22
See Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Representations, 16
C.F.R. § 251 (2012).
23
See generally David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. REV. 49
(2008) [hereinafter Friedman, Free Offers] (describing the history of free offer regulation,
the regulatory embrace of the free offer, and the cognitive distortions that free offers induce).
18
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Also outside the formal bait-and-switch definition, but perhaps within
its popular definition, are “teasers”—low-price introductory offers that can
be used to lure consumers into arrangements where the terms can turn dramatically against their favor once they are locked in. The history of credit
card rate regulation provides a high-profile example. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 200924 (CARD Act) applied the brakes on well-established customary tactics. Historically, banks
would dangle low rates to acquire customers and later raise the rate on their
balances.25 The CARD Act embodiment of bait-and-switch-like regulation
provides further opportunity to explore how underlying economic and political forces can suddenly change the deep customs and culture associated
with a set of business practices.
If one accepts the factual basis of the law students’ 2011 allegations,26
Golden Gate could have been offering a “teaser,” but could not be said to be
engaging in unlawful bait-and-switch behavior. The school sincerely intended to offer the students additional educational services, and did not intend to use the initial offering to “switch” the students to purchase something different. The students cried foul about a change in price that they felt
resulted from a misleading initial offer. The argument about law school
merit scholarships mirrors27 some of the problems addressed by the CARD
Act. Understanding the cultural dynamics that drove Congress to regulate
bait-and-switch practices with sudden severity might prove instructive for
understanding how students may have effected a modest change in law
school merit scholarship practices.28 If custom and culture drive regulation
24

See generally Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
25
See infra Part III.C for historical context.
26
The Golden Gate University Law School students have filed a class action lawsuit in
California Superior Court that largely centers on false advertising and unfair competition related
to job-placement and starting salary data. See Class Action Complaint at 2-4, 9-16, Arring v.
Golden Gate Univ., No. CGC-12-517837 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://www
.anziskalaw.com/uploads/Filed_Golden_Gate_Complaint.pdf [hereinafter Complaint]. The law
school merit scholarship issue is mentioned briefly in the Complaint, and the New York Times
article, Segal, supra note 1, is attached to the Complaint as the first exhibit. See Complaint, supra
note 26, at 10–11, Exhibit 1. The two paragraphs of the Complaint that focus on the merit
scholarship draw on the article’s profile of Golden Gate graduate Alexandra Leumer, but
Leumer is not a lead plaintiff. See id.
27
I use the present tense because it is unclear if the “argument” has ended.
28
Standard 509(e) requires disclosure about conditional scholarships with a focus on
presenting scholarship retention data to the public and to scholarship offerees. Standard
509(e), supra note 1. Mandated disclosure may not always help consumers, as I discuss
infra Part III.C.2. It remains unclear whether students would seek to eliminate conditional
scholarships entirely in favor of a more certain financial aid structure. See id.
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more so than welfare advancement, the roadmap to change, including the
obstacles, is clearer.
Each flavor of bait-and-switch regulation provides an opportunity to
explore the ways we have permitted custom to prevail over welfare advancement. In Part I, to provide grounding, I describe the current regulatory approach toward bait and switch. In Part II, I provide an overview of the
theory undergirding the role norms and customs play in commercial regulation. In Part III, I examine three distinct categories of bait-and-switch behavior and regulation to assess whether they reinforce norms or customs and
whether the regulatory approach promotes welfare advancement. In Part
III.A, I examine “traditional” bait-and-switch regulation, as the FTC defines it, including special rules for retail grocers. In Part III.B, I analyze
“free offer regulation,” and in Part III.C, “teaser” regulation via the CARD
Act and first-year law school merit scholarships, respectively. I also discuss “lawful” forms of bait and switch and the role of custom in Part III.D.
In Part IV, I globally assess the interplay between custom, norms, and welfare advancement in the regulation of broader bait-and-switch practices,
and describe why this approach endures.
Below, I will outline the role of bait-and-switch regulation in our consumer economy. I then follow with a discussion of how the role of custom
in commercial regulation informs discussion about the social welfare cost
of custom in bait-and-switch regulation. Ultimately, I conclude that the primacy of custom and norms should compel policymakers to carefully consider the welfare impact of commercial regulations—and should inform advocates about how to influence regulatory change.
I. CURRENT BAIT-AND-SWITCH REGULATION
Bait-and-switch tactics are an effective tool for sellers to generate transactions, but the custom belying the regulation varies by context. For the
purposes of the Article, I refer to the FTC’s definition of bait and switch
as “traditional bait and switch.” The lawfulness of a “traditional bait and
switch” is determined by some measure of the “sincerity” of the promoted
offer. For enforcement purposes, lawfulness is, in part, discerned by the
propriety of disclosure to the consumer about the nature of the “bait.”29
The custom and norm would naturally be to regard “insincere” offers as
ill-mannered. The public might associate unscrupulous retailers30 and slick
29

I describe this regulatory scheme in more detail in Part III.D.
See, e.g., In re Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. 1361, 1362–63 (1968), aff’d, 437 F.2d 707,
709 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (regarding bait and switch involving cheap eyeglasses), discussed
infra Part III.A.3.
30
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sales forces31 with these practices, and our stern regulation of traditional bait
and switch matches this norm against insincerity.32 For example, in the late
1960s, the FTC viewed bait and switch in retail grocery through the lens
of the War on Poverty and regulated aggressively to meet that norm.33 The
FTC later pulled back on retail grocery regulation in the 1980s era where
deregulation became the ethos.34 Economic studies were used to support
the initial regulation and the later deregulation, but even the very choice of
the line of economic inquiry reveals that regulators were concerned with
prevailing norms.35
Marketing tactics are, of course, designed to induce consumers to transact. If a transaction occurs, the parties make an exchange because the subjective value of what they receive from each other exceeds the value of what
they give in return. Such an exchange advances social welfare.36
Rational choice theory often explains behavior that deviates from utility
maximization as resulting from market failures like monopoly and informational asymmetries.37 Bait-and-switch practices can indeed tamper with the
information flow and exploit the structure of the market.38 These impurities
can spoil the market and potentially destroy welfare.39 If sellers are deceptive,
buyers should subsequently experience frustration in realizing the subjective
value they expected.

31

See, e.g., All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc. v. F.T.C., 423 F.2d 423, 425 (4th Cir. 1970); In re
S. States Dist. Co., 83 F.T.C. 1126, 1127–29 (1973) (regarding bait and switch involving sale of
home improvement products), discussed infra Part III.A.1 and Part III.A.2, respectively.
32
However, the FTC separated retail grocers from the traditional bait-and-switch
regulatory umbrella. See Retail Food Store Advertising and Marketing Practices, 16 C.F.R.
§ 424.2. In 1971, the FTC promulgated stricter guidelines for retail grocers but loosened them
in 1989, using economic justifications at both junctures. I discuss this separate regulatory
approach in detail, infra Part III.A.4.
33
See generally STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT
ON FOOD CHAIN SELLING PRACTICES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND SAN FRANCISCO
(1969) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REPORT ON FOOD CHAIN SELLING] (on file with author).
34
See infra Part III.A.4, discussing the intersection between the cultural attitude toward regulation and retail grocer bait and switch.
35
See infra Part III.A.4, discussing norms in retail grocery regulation.
36
See 1 LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 203–04 (rev.
ed. 1963) (“People buy and sell only because they appraise the things given up less than
those received.”).
37
See Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 790, 793–94 (2000).
38
A dominant retailer can effectively manipulate a set of buyers that have an absence of a
meaningful transactional alternative, diminishing the natural salutary effects of competition.
39
See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven Salop, The Efficient Regulation of
Consumer Information, 24 J. L. & ECON. 491, 505–06 (1981).
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Though common law provides general avenues for these buyers to redress these deception scenarios 40 (through defenses like fraud, 41 unconscionability,42 and unilateral mistake43), regulation also directs behavior in
the marketplace. In this instance, section 5 of the FTC Act declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,”44 providing rulemaking45 and enforcement authority46 to the FTC.
Bait-and-switch guidance and enforcement fall within this anti-deception
regime. The FTC has promulgated guides as to what constitutes bait-andswitch deception,47 and has enforced bait-and-switch cases under section
5.48 The states also offer protection against bait and switch through “little
FTC Acts,” often providing private remedies.49 The state bait-and-switch
laws tend to mirror the federal approach,50 so I focus on the FTC’s action
in this area. In Part I.A, I describe the FTC’s guidance. In Part I.B, I discuss the welfare economics of bait and switch and explore the limited literature on the subject. A basic understanding of “traditional” bait-and-switch
regulation will set a baseline for the discussion of the welfare impact.
A. FTC Guidance on Bait and Switch
The FTC’s “Guides Against Bait Advertising”51 provide sellers with a
crisp outline of how the FTC internally defines a violation of section 5 in
the bait-and-switch zone. The FTC defines “bait” as
40

As do statutory regimes—e.g., the UCC also protects buyers through implied warranties among other mechanisms. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2-714.
41
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159, 162, 164, 167 (1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526, 530 (1977).
42
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977).
43
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981).
44
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
45
15 U.S.C. § 57A.
46
15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
47
Guides are promulgated to help advertisers understand how the FTC interprets the
law, but they are not binding. To prosecute a case, the FTC must bring the action under
section 5 of the FTC Act. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.5, 1.8 (2012); A Brief Overview of the
Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION (July 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm.
48
See infra Part III for examples.
49
For an exhaustive resource about state laws in the area of “baby FTC Acts,” see
generally UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.,
Consumer Credit & Sales Legal Practice Series, 6th ed. 2004).
50
Compare 16 C.F.R. § 238 (2012) with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West
2012), N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396.1 (McKinney 2012), and TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.46(b)(9)–(10) (West 2012).
51
16 C.F.R. § 238.
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an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or service which the
advertiser in truth does not intend or want to sell. Its purpose is to switch
consumers from buying the advertised merchandise, in order to sell
something else, usually at a higher price or on a basis more advantageous
to the advertiser.52

The FTC also looks to the motive of an advertisement, defining bait as advertisements with “[t]he primary aim” of “obtain[ing] leads as to persons
interested in” purchasing other merchandise.53
The Guides also focus on the intent and character of the initial impression that the offer leaves on the consumer. An advertised offer should not
be published if it does not represent “a bona fide effort to sell the advertised product.”54 Further, “[n]o statement or illustration should be used in
any advertisement which creates a false impression” about attributes of the
offering, where revelation of the truth about the product would switch the
buyer from the featured offering to a different one.55 Subsequent disclosure of the truth to the consumer would not present a defense to the FTC
“if the first contact or interview is secured by deception.”56 The FTC also
singles out certain behaviors that could constitute a violation of section 5,
notably “discouragement of purchase of [the] advertised merchandise”57
and post-sale switches.58 All of these together comprise current bait-andswitch regulation at the federal level.59
Though this FTC definition may seem like a straightforward, welfareenhancing attempt to combat deception, the economics of bait and switch
are a bit more complex. Next, I attempt to describe the welfare dynamics
of the FTC’s approach.
B. Bait-and-Switch Economics
Before assessing the scant literature about the welfare impact of the
FTC’s brand of bait-and-switch regulation, it is worth revisiting this regulation in the context of the FTC’s broader institutional purpose. The FTC
declares a mission “[t]o prevent business practices that are anticompetitive
or deceptive or unfair to consumers; to enhance informed consumer choice
52

16 C.F.R. § 238.0.
Id.
54
16 C.F.R. § 238.1.
55
16 C.F.R. § 238.2(a).
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See 16 C.F.R. § 238.2(b).
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See 16 C.F.R. § 238.3.
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See 16 C.F.R. § 238.4.
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As noted infra Part III.A.4, retail-grocer bait-and-switch regulation differs somewhat.
See Retail Food Store Advertising and Marketing Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 424 (2012).
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and public understanding of the competitive process; and to accomplish
this without unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”60 In sum, the
FTC wishes to elevate the level of business practices without unnecessarily slowing commerce.
The FTC’s vision focuses more tightly on its role in promoting welfare
advancement and the interests of consumers. The FTC envisions “[a] U.S.
economy characterized by vigorous competition among producers and consumer access to accurate information, yielding high-quality products at low
prices and encouraging efficiency, innovation, and consumer choice.”61
In the traditional case of bait and switch, where a buyer is switched
through any sort of insincere tactic, it is entirely consistent with the mission
of the FTC to deem these practices deceptive. But does bait-and-switch regulation advance welfare? As I discuss, formal economic studies of bait-andswitch laws are few. But in order to divine the source of bait-and-switch
regulation in different contexts and account for the impact of regulation,
this welfare impact question should be answered to the extent possible.
In order to set the stage for understanding the effect of traditional baitand-switch regulation, it is helpful to compare two hypothetical, simple illustrations to contextualize the literature.
1. Illustration A: Traditional Bait and Switch
Assume that Alpha Autos, a used-car dealership, draws Consumer A to
the Alpha lot with an “alluring but insincere” advertisement depicting a blue
1996 Nissan Sentra for sale at the bargain price of $3000. Upon Consumer
A’s arrival on the premises and two hours of negotiation, Alpha Autos pulls
a “switch” and instead sells the consumer a higher profit-margin car, a 1994
Dodge Colt for $5000. Also assume that the dealer disparaged the blue Nissan Sentra once the consumer was on the lot, or simply assume that the
dealer never intended to sell the Sentra to anyone.
In this example, Alpha Autos has employed an unfair and deceptive
practice that the FTC has been charged with stamping out. The hypothetical
dealer has certainly violated the bait-and-switch guidelines. The bait was
“alluring but insincere,” the dealer “[did] not intend ... to sell” the Sentra,
and used the Sentra offer for purposes of “sell[ing] something else.”62 In
60

About the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 9.
Id.
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See 16 C.F.R. § 238.0 (“Bait advertising is an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product
or service which the advertiser in truth does not intend or want to sell. Its purpose is to switch
consumers from buying the advertised merchandise, in order to sell something else, usually at a
higher price or on a basis more advantageous to the advertiser.” (emphasis added)).
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this case, the auto dealer put Consumer A in the psychological position of
absorbing “sunk costs.”63 Sunk cost incurrence generates a fallacy—an irrational “tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made.”64 One study concludes that this phenomenon
is rooted in the “maladaptive ... desire [of people] not to appear wasteful.”65
The sunk-cost fallacy has been used to explain routine behavior (for example, why people will continue to watch bad movies until the closing credits)
and more spectacular behavior (for example, why the United States continued to remain engaged in the Vietnam Conflict).66 Sunk costs should not
bear on instant choices, but they do. They are irrecoverable.67
In this Alpha Autos illustration, Consumer A “feels” the sunk costs of
traveling to Alpha Autos and putting time into negotiation. Consumer A
may also feel a disproportionate obligation to reciprocate68 and reward a
salesperson who put time into serving and educating him. The consumer is
not imprisoned on site, but the dealer has some control over the consumer’s physical presence and attention. Additionally, time constraints may
edge Consumer A to transact rather than continue car shopping elsewhere.
Time, the ultimate scarce resource, may constrain the consumer’s choices,
if the consumer has urgency to transact.
Eradication of this marketplace behavior might advance social welfare.
Consumer A purchased the Dodge Colt for $5000. Entering the dealership,
Consumer A expected to purchase the Nissan Sentra for $3000. The seller
used tactics that put a thumb on the scale, leading Consumer A to complete
a transaction that might not have been made without the weight of the sunk
cost fallacy. If Consumer A would not have made the Dodge Colt transaction without Alpha’s deceptive approach, this transaction may have led to a
misallocation of resources and welfare. If Consumer A wises up to the trick
later, he may experience more post-transaction disappointment. One can see
how this bait and switch could reduce utility for the consumer.69
63

See generally Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 124, 124–25 (1985).
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Id. at 124.
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Id. at 125.
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Id. at 126.
67
Id. at 125–26.
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This obligation, rooted in the “reciprocity norm,” might attach in any complex sales
scenario. The reciprocity norm reflects the human tendency to return favors, but this
tendency can be easily exploited in the context of consumer transactions. For a general
discussion of the reciprocity norm, see Jerry M. Burger et al., The Norm of Reciprocity as
an Internalized Social Norm: Returning Favors Even When No One Finds Out, 4 SOC.
INFLUENCE 11, 11–12 (2009); Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary
Statement, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 161, 161–62 (1960).
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See generally Ulen, supra note 37, at 793–94.
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2. Illustration B: No Bait and Switch
Next, assume that Consumer B, a virtual clone of Consumer A in preferences, approaches Beta Motors, a used-car dealer competing directly
with Alpha Auto. Beta maintains a similar inventory to Alpha. Beta Motors advertises a blue 1996 Nissan Sentra for sale at $3000, just as in the
Alpha scenario.
Consumer B walks into the dealership ready to buy the Sentra, only to
learn from the salesperson that the Sentra had been sold earlier that morning. Apologizing for any disappointment, the salesperson asks Consumer
B if she has interest in the Dodge Colt that Beta Motors has on the lot for
$5000. At the end of two hours of negotiation, Consumer B purchases the
Colt at that price.
Here, Beta Motors led with an “alluring but sincere” offer. The purpose of having the Sentra on the lot was not to enable a “switch.” No baitand-switch problem emerges. Yet, the same outcome is reached. Sunk
costs were incurred by Consumer B, but not through a sneaky practice.
Consumer B was just unlucky—the first car was gone. Beta Motors was
lucky, because the sold car effectively functioned as bait, even though it
would not be classified as bait.
At the end of their respective transactions, Consumer A and Consumer
B might be considered at first glance to be in similar welfare positions.
They bought the same Dodge Colt for the same price after being lured in
by the prospect of buying the Nissan Sentra. The sunk-cost fallacy works
in the dealer’s favor in both scenarios. The “cost of leaving”70 effectively
creates a temporary monopoly by keeping the customer on the lots of both
hypothetical dealerships. But this is a static and incomplete view of welfare. As I delve into the literature, I will explain why a dynamic view is
required to fully understand the welfare impact.
3. The Welfare Impact
Continuing with our hypothetical competing dealers, a welfare problem lies with the fact that Beta Motors would not survive long in a marketplace with Alpha as the competitor. Alpha would use the Sentra as bait
and never sell it. Beta would sincerely offer the Sentra, sell it, and lose its
lure when it leaves the lot. Alpha would draw more traffic with the permanent “insincere” Sentra lure, all else equal. If Beta found it effective to
70

This cost is reflected both as a real transaction cost reflected in restarting negotiation
from the beginning with a different dealer, and as a sunk cost.
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draw in people with Sentras as a loss leader of sorts,71 but wanted to deal
honestly, it would require Beta to carry more inventory and use more capital. Honesty proves more expensive—perhaps fatally expensive in the marketplace. The existing economics literature supports this conclusion.
a. The “Lemons” Literature
In his Nobel Prize-winning work about “the market for ‘lemons,’” 72
George Akerlof observes that dishonest practices, if left intact, tend to prevail
over honest practices.73 In the bait-and-switch circumstance, the seller that dangles the insincere bait effectively prevails over the seller that plays honestly.
Consider a market in which goods are sold honestly or dishonestly ....
There may be potential buyers of good quality products and there may
be potential sellers of such products in the appropriate price range;
however, the presence of people who wish to pawn bad wares as good
wares tends to drive out the legitimate business. The cost of dishonesty,
therefore, lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred from driving legitimate
business out of existence.74

In this instance, we would consider the presence of people who wish to
use bait as equivalent to those pawning “bad wares.” Those who pawn bad
wares with impunity will either drive other legitimate businesses to behave
badly in a “race to the bottom,” as game theory and the “prisoner’s dilemma” might predict,75 or simply eliminate them from the market.76 If
one accepts that Akerlof’s dynamic would be at work in the absence of
regulation, bait-and-switch regulation should advance welfare.
If the tactic employed by Alpha Autos succeeds and pervades in the
marketplace, consumers could also prove more wary in the long term, as
they absorb initial offerings and then transact. Consumers might enter the
marketplace with a defensive posture, not willing to pay as much for items
due to suspicions about deceit. Akerlof’s work on “lemons” might provide a
71

This is a “sincere” mechanism for driving customer traffic to the dealer.
George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970). Akerlof was awarded a Nobel Prize in
Economics for this work. See Jon E. Hilsenrath, Three Americans Win Nobel for Economics,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2001, at A2.
73
See Akerlof, supra note 72, at 495.
74
Id.
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See Prisoner’s Dilemma, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 22, 2007), http://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.
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The FTC’s stated goal to prevent anticompetitive behavior would be served by preventing this race to the bottom. See About the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 9.
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basis for understanding these welfare effects, too. As Akerlof noted, information asymmetry leads to market failures.77 A seller of a used car, for example, knows more about the car’s attributes than the buyer. The buyer
might not be willing to pay the price that the seller thinks the car is worth
because the buyer has less information, making the transaction more risky.78
This leads to a market failure. A marketplace that rewards deceit is a marketplace where distrust raises transaction costs and counterparty risk, and
welfare does not advance.79
b. The Marketing Economics Literature
Would Alpha Autos’ practices instantly or ultimately reduce consumer
welfare? The limited research on the topic80 is more controversial than one
might anticipate. Eitan Gerstner and James Hess provoked a debate with
another set of economists on this question in the 1990s by contending that
traditional bait-and-switch practices could potentially benefit consumers.81
Other analysis and evidence indicates otherwise. 82 But the Gerstner and
Hess analysis provides a starting point for understanding the welfare impact.
In 1990, Gerstner and Hess argued that that the FTC’s viewpoint on
bait and switch was “myopic.”83 They noted that the FTC’s approach did
not account for the competitive dynamic that could follow from bait and
switch, notably, downward pressure on prices from aggressive sales promotions.84 Gerstner and Hess also maintained that traditional regulation of
bait and switch ignored the ultimate reputational impact bait and switch
had on sellers; that is, the notion that repeated deployment of abusive sales
practices would destroy a seller’s reputation and prove unsustainable. 85
Further, they argued that sales of “featured items” led to inventory stock
outs that were already anticipated by the consumer, but at the same time
77

See Akerlof, supra note 72, at 490.
Id. at 489–90.
79
Akerlof illustrates this by describing the dysfunction of credit markets in India circa
1970. Id. at 497–99.
80
The core research in the legal and social science literature is scarce, but in intellectual property, initial interest confusion is often discussed in the context of bait and switch.
See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and
False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1354–55 (2011).
81
See the first study, Gerstner & Hess I, supra note 5, at 121; then see Wilkie et al. I,
supra note 5, at 273–74; and in reply see Hess & Gerstner II, supra note 5, at 283; and in
further reply see Wilkie et al. II, supra note 5, at 290.
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Wilkie et al. I, supra note 5, at 274.
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stimulated welfare-advancing sales of complementary products at lossleader pricing.86 Gerstner and Hess further elaborated that:
[T]he process of bait and switch can enhance economic efficiency ....
Competition to attract customers motivates retailers to cut the prices of
featured brands to very low levels .... [T]hese [tactics] motivate in-store
promotions that add real utility. Stores must guard against overdoing it
when customers foresee stock outs. They cannot take full advantage of
the monopoly power over customers already at the store because they
are committed to a low price for the featured brand ....87

These assumptions about competition presume, however, that the markets
function efficiently. In certain low-income market zones, they might not. As I
discuss in Part III, reputation and competition may not alleviate the deception
where consumers lack meaningful retail choices—especially in lower-income
neighborhoods, or certain sectors like retail grocery.88 But the conjecture that
aggressive sales tactics might benefit the consumer through loss leadership
might carry some weight. Could a sleazy car dealership lose reputation and
lose business to an ethical car dealership? Akerlof’s work predicts the opposite result—that the unethical dealership model would prevail.
In 1998, the journal Marketing Science published a rejoinder to the
1990 Gerstner and Hess article.89 Wilkie et al. extended the Gerstner and
Hess model, challenged its underlying assumptions, and concluded that
bait and switch should remain prohibited.90 Wilkie’s key critique was that
the “planned fraud and deceit” at the core of bait-and-switch practices
were absent from and needed to be included in the analysis.91 In the rejoinder, these authors drew upon the facts of an enforcement action92 to
surface several observations about bait and switch that were ignored in the
previous paper:
x

86

“Actions are coordinated and practiced, relying on gaining
sales through deception.”93

Id.
Id. at 122.
88
See infra Part III.A.
89
Richard Staelin, Editorial: A Discussion of Bait and Switch, 17 MARKETING SCI. 271,
271 (1998). Publishing such rejoinders and replies was unprecedented for the journal, but
the editor agreed to publish the piece because the issue was “very important (i.e., could alter
the field, conclusions are major, etc.).” Id.
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Wilkie et al. I, supra note 5, at 273.
91
Id. at 280.
92
In re New Rapids Carpet Ctr., Inc., 90 F.T.C. 64, 64, 75–76, 93–96 (1977).
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“Huge increases in actual prices paid by bait-and-switch
victims are common ... [and could potentially range] from
double to nine times the price featured in the bait ad.”94
“Customers are often poor, uneducated and susceptible to
‘hard-sell’ techniques.”95
“[P]ost-sale actions of bait-and-switch sellers often reveal a
contempt for their customers ... includ[ing] refusals to honor
warranties ... [and other post-sale promises] ....”96

In the analysis of actual traditional bait-and-switch cases infra Part III, I
find similar practices. Further, Wilkie et al. note that bait and switch exploits marketplace imperfections and that the assumption of perfect competition in these markets “belies ... reality.”97 Under the Wilkie view, traditional bait-and-switch regulation would certainly advance welfare.
Hess and Gerstner then answered this sharp rejoinder, reiterating and
amplifying their original conclusion. They summarize:
In every condition in which a law “might” protect customers from bait and
switch, market competition alone forces retailers to drop the practice as
unprofitable, so the law is moot. In every condition in which the practice of
bait and switch creates social value, market competition always transfers
the value to the customers, so a law prohibiting the practice actually
damages consumer welfare .... In a competitive market when stock outs
and upselling occur, they create welfare gains; when they would create
welfare losses, [stock outs and upselling] do not occur.98

Wilkie et al. wrote a final response, emphasizing that all of the original
modeling had focused on the impact of unavailability, ignoring scenarios
where the bait and switch involved deliberate, naked deception.99 This exchange reflects the entirety of the marketing economics literature on the
subject, but when combined with Akerlof’s contribution to understanding
markets and information asymmetry, it does seem that regulation of baitand-switch practices would advance welfare.
The examples of traditional bait and switch that I explore more fully infra Part III.A demonstrate how the practice can create consumer injury.
Questions remain about why certain bait-and-switch practices are regulated
94

Wilkie et al. I, supra note 5, at 274–75.
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more tightly than others, but Akerlof’s observation that bad actors can bring
down marketplace standards and ultimately drive out good actors should be
taken seriously.
Additionally, apart from the core welfare economics, there is still a
question about what kind of commercial atmosphere regulators should foster. The very spirit of bait-and-switch regulation disfavors insincerity and
tricks. Perhaps even if Gerstner and Hess were proven correct, regulators
would still ignore that conclusion, emphasizing fairness and norms over
welfare advancement.
Additionally, questions are raised about what kind of transactional environment consumers would want to experience. How should the marketplace
“feel” or “look” to consumers? These are cultural questions, perhaps more
so than welfare questions. Before moving to discussion of specific bait-andswitch tactics, in Part II, I provide some context about the interplay between
culture, customs, norms, and welfare advancement. This enables a richer
discussion of the range of tactics in Part III, and whether norms and customs
trump welfare, and if so, whether they should.
II. CUSTOM, NORMS, AND WELFARE ADVANCEMENT
Commercial environments reflect broader underlying values and culture.
Bargaining styles, for example, vary cross-culturally and these differences are
even visible in childhood and adolescence. A study of children from Argentina, India, and the United States reveals that even at a young age, negotiating
patterns differ dramatically.100 Practical business literature offers observations
about bargaining cultures and values. For example, a Harvard Business Review article attempted to explain the cultural roots of the Chinese approach to
bargaining and compare it to the American approach:
Chinese negotiators are more concerned with the means than the end,
with the process more than the goal. The best compromises are derived
only through the ritual back-and-forth of haggling.... While Americans
tend to believe that the truth, as they see it, is worth arguing over and
even getting angry about, the Chinese believe that the way is hard to find
and so rely on haggling to settle differences.101

Regardless of whether this observation overly generalizes, it shows an instance where culture, norms, and custom matter—and they certainly matter
100

See Daniel Druckman et al., Cultural Differences in Bargaining Behavior: India,
Argentina, and the United States, 20 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 413, 413 (1976).
101
John L. Graham & N. Mark Lam, The Chinese Negotiation, 81 HARV. BUS. REV.
82, 84–85 (2003).
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where values need to be reinforced with rules. If bargaining customs are
ingrained in our values, then certainly custom might guide policymaking
about trade practice regulation. If commercial culture eschews the practices
associated with traditional bait and switch, perhaps that rejection reflects a
collective belief that “truth” in the bargaining process matters as much as or
more than the outcome. Another culture’s tradition might find traditional
bait and switch to be a natural part of the haggling ritual—the American
cultural custom apparently finds traditional bait and switch to be repugnant.
Custom and norms played an express role in the formation of commercial law and in the development of common law standards for other commercial behavior. Karl Llewellyn and the reporters who drafted the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC or the Code) expressed that they were aspiring to
incorporate the best business practices and customs into the default rules
governing sales transactions.102 Particularly among merchants, the UCC incorporates custom as a default standard for commercial behavior.103
The role of custom in commerce also emerges in other jurisprudence. In
the famous torts case, The T.J. Hooper,104 Judge Learned Hand noted that
trade custom could inform the standard of due care, and that reasonable care
could be apart from established custom.105 Indeed, the prevailing custom
could merely reflect that an industry had simply fallen behind the times with
respect to technological advances, and done so in lockstep.106 Judge Hand
presciently warned that adopting a trailing, but prevailing, custom would
not necessarily provide an appropriate standard and advance welfare.107
In his revisiting of The T.J. Hooper, Richard Epstein offers a “fresh
view” of the role of custom in guiding the law of negligence.108 He argues
that “in [tort] cases that arise out of a consensual arrangement ... custom
should be regarded as conclusive evidence of due care ... where consistent
custom emerges, ... it should be followed.”109 I contend that the importance
Epstein attaches to custom in tort110 can be transplanted into the commercial, transactional zone explored here. For the purposes of this Article, however, I am less focused on Epstein’s overall conclusions about custom than I
102

See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
See id.
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The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 737, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1932).
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am interested in his framework that predicts when custom will emerge to
guide formal rules.111
Bait-and-switch regulation varies by context, and Epstein’s framework
may provide insight into what drives the variance. It should be noted that
Epstein expresses skepticism about the role of custom112 in guiding development of contract law in a “new regulatory world” where custom “[might]
be taken as evidence of the pervasive and illicit power of landlords, employers, manufacturers, or sellers of all sizes and descriptions.”113 Yet, as I
demonstrate, custom, if defined as general expectations of market behavior,
does explain the bait-and-switch regulatory approach, just as it expressly
does within the confines of the UCC.114
Next, in Part II.A I describe how custom intertwines with commercial
practices, using as fodder the drafting of the UCC and also Epstein’s
framework for assessing the role of custom in consensual commercial relationships. In Part II.B, I discuss the implications of reinforcing custom
through formal law. Finally, Part II.C explores the relationship between enforcing custom and norms, and advancement of efficiency and welfare.
A. Custom and Commercial Practices
As a custom, bait-and-switch tactics have been long regarded as a
scourge in the commercial marketplace. Ralph Rohner and Fred Miller aptly
describe bait and switch as aiming to subvert an “ancient but dishonorable
practice.”115 This observation raises a question. If the practice is ancient, is
the practice a custom? Or is the notion that it is “dishonorable” the custom?
I would contend that the custom is reflected more completely in the “dishonorable” description. Theft is also ancient practice, but the taboo and dishonor of theft is as old as the underlying practice.
As I discuss in Part II.A.1, the drafters of the UCC embraced custom.116 For example, custom in the form of “usage of the trade” has been
incorporated into the Code and provides standards for behavior for transactions between both merchants in a trade, and merchants and nonmerchants.117 The Code drafters’ hidden agenda to embrace customs that
111
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would elevate standards, rather than just formally capture them, resembles
the agenda of bait-and-switch regulators. As I discuss in Part II.A.2, in
certain parts of the commercial environment, the asymmetry of transacting
parties creates conditions unfavorable for the natural emergence of a stable
custom, as Epstein would predict.118 Regulators overlay a rule when stable
custom fails to emerge.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2 of the UCC results from efforts by the American Law Institute
to harness and embrace custom or “usage of trade” and practices among
merchants into a uniform law that would promote expansion of commercial
activity through application of evolving commercial standards.119 As Lisa
Bernstein writes, the UCC was premised on urging courts to discern the
“immanent business norms.”120
The Code wastes no time in declaring its underlying aims, which are
tightly tied to providing custom-based default rules for commercial relationships. UCC section 1-103, which covers “[c]onstruction of [the Code] to
[p]romote its [p]urposes and [p]olicies,” guides that “[the Code] must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies,
[among] which are ... to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties ....”121 The Code
even defines “agreement” as “the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in
their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade ....”122
“Usage of trade” is also defined in the Code and presents a more inclusive and current view of custom than the old English common law, that is,
holding that more recently created custom, rather than ancient custom could
118

See infra Part II.A.2.
See U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (2012). The Code “is drawn to provide flexibility so
that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent and infrequently-amended piece of
legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices.” Id.
The structure of the Code should enable the law “to be applied by the courts in the light
of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices.” Id.
120
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search
for Immanent Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant
Law]. Bernstein challenges this “fundamental premise of the ... Code’s adjudicative philosophy,” noting that the drafters did not anticipate how incorporating norms could “alter
the very reality they sought to reflect.” Id. at 1766, 1769.
121
U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(2) (2012). The other purposes are “(1) to simplify, clarify, and
modernize the law governing commercial transactions; ... and (3) to make uniform the
law among the various jurisdictions.” § 1-103(a)(1), § 1-103(a)(3).
122
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provide the standard.123 UCC section 1-303(c) defines “usage of trade [as]
any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a
place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to the transaction in question.”124 The Official Comments further elaborate on the definition and emphasize that the Code presents a formal break from the old English common law,125 including a willingness to
embrace merchant-created custom:
A usage of trade ... must have the “regularity of observance” specified.
The ancient English tests for “custom” are abandoned in this connection.
Therefore, it is not required that a usage of trade be “ancient or immemorial,” “universal,” or the like.... [F]ull recognition is thus available for
new usages and for usages currently observed by the great majority of decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree.126

Key sections of Article 2127 and the Official Comments128 are laden with
examples of the incorporation of commercial norms, as are the contemporaneous writings of Karl Llewellyn,129 the principal drafter of the Code.130
Llewellyn, in offering a critique of the Code’s predecessor, the Uniform Sales
Act, noted “the amazing degree to which [the Uniform Sales Act] has failed
123

For a summary of the old English law, see 12 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 34:12 (Supp. 2012).
124
U.C.C. § 1-303(c).
125
Though I am primarily concerned with the formal codification that embraces
custom, note that modern common law, reflected in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 222 (1981) (“Usage of Trade”), also departs from the old common law
rules requiring custom and usage of trade to have more established rooting. As § 222
comment b clarifies: “A usage of trade need not be ‘ancient or immemorial,’ ‘universal,’
or the like. Unless agreed to in fact, it must be reasonable, but commercial acceptance by
regular observance makes out a prima facie case that a usage of trade is reasonable.” Id.
at cmt. b. The common law is also “modernizing” custom by drawing upon more recent
and local evidence to define it.
126
U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 4.
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description ....”); U.C.C. § 2-314(3) (“[I]mplied warranties may arise from course of
dealing or usage of trade.”). The section on adequate assurances of performance does as
well. See U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (“Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for
insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to
commercial standards.”).
128
See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 120, at 1766 n.3 (citing several examples).
129
See id. at 1768 n.6, for examples of Llewellyn’s expressed point of view on the role
of custom.
130
Id. at 1768.
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to reflect either commercial understanding or commercial need ....”131 This
foreshadowed the custom-based approach he and the other drafters would
later incorporate in the Code.132 The drafting of Article 2 of the UCC provides a primary illustration of the controversy of reinforcing custom.133
In framing the newly crafted code for merchants, Llewellyn explained
that the Code was
not something new in the law .... [T]his is ... a bringing into clarity and
explicit focus of a thing which is really there and which has been in the
law of sales for something more than a hundred years .... The merchant
appears in the present law without raising his head and letting it be
known that he is there.134

A closer look reveals that Llewellyn’s assertion may not have reflected the
whole truth. In examining the “merchant rules,” Ingrid Hillinger concludes
that Llewellyn “invented” them.135 Hillinger cites Llewellyn’s expressed
drafting principle that “[s]impler, clearer, and better adjusted rules, built to
make sense and to protect good faith, make for more foreseeable and more
satisfactory results both in court and out,”136 and his “passionate desire to
make ‘commercial law and practice clear, sane, and safe.’”137 Llewellyn’s
expressive embrace of custom echoes throughout commercial regulation.
Commercial regulation often applies custom and then stretches it for the same
ends—clarity, sanity, and safety. This approach may or may not advance
welfare, but it will create different atmospherics for market participants.
2. Custom and Commercial Negligence
From a different angle, torts jurisprudence can further illuminate the
relationship between custom and commercial regulation. The enduring138
131

Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REV.
341, 389 n.124 (1937).
132
Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 120, at 1768 n.6.
133
See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt
to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1144–45
nn.16–18 (1985); see also Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 947, 948 (1997).
134
1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMITTEE REPORT, HEARINGS ON THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 165 (1954) (emphasis added) [hereinafter N.Y. LAW
REVISION REPORT]; see Hillinger, supra note 133, at 1141–42 n.4.
135
Hillinger, supra note 133, at 1146.
136
See id. at 1147; Karl N. Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counselling and
Advocacy—Especially in Commercial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 178 (1946).
137
See Hillinger, supra note 133, at 1146–47; N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT, supra
note 134, at 112.
138
“[T]he issue [in The T.J. Hooper] has arisen in thousands of tort cases ....” Epstein,
supra note 108, at 4.
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The T.J. Hooper139 case demonstrates the special role of commercial custom in tort law. The case inspired Richard Epstein to offer a framework
for identifying scenarios where custom should effectively emerge as a
guiding standard for consensual commercial behavior.140 “Virtually none
of the case law on custom is directed to weak customs. The key question,
then, is: What are the determinants for a customary practice to develop
within a consensual situation?”141 Epstein sets out to identify them, and I
set out to apply them to broader bait-and-switch scenarios.
Epstein first divides the commercial landscape into situations where
the roles of the parties are either symmetrical or asymmetrical.142 Where
the roles of parties are symmetrical, custom more easily emerges to serve
as the rule, as the parties emerge from the same point of view and benefit
from custom.143 This dynamic is evident in the relationships between merchants that Llewellyn identified. The narrower and more symmetrical or
identical the roles, the more likely it is that natural custom will emerge as
a rule generator. 144 Cotton and diamond merchants, for example, have
been found to operate under a well-established set of formalistic rules
unique to their industries.145
Where the parties lack symmetry, there is less common ground of custom. Custom is less likely to emerge to provide the ultimate rule because it
would be the imposition of one party’s custom onto the other. Epstein posits
that in this asymmetric zone, the frequency of the interaction of the parties
139

In The T.J. Hooper, the court found that custom did not necessarily set the standard
of care and that certain precautions must be taken to avoid negligence liability regardless of
prevailing practices. 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). In this case, the practices at issue
involved the carrying of radio sets on tugboats. Id. at 737. Judge Learned Hand held:
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but
strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in
the adoption of new and available devices. It never may set its own tests,
however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is
required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal
disregard will not excuse their omission.
Id. at 740.
140
Epstein, supra note 108, at 4.
141
Id. at 11.
142
Id. at 11–13.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 11–12.
145
See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1724
(2001); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND
SOCIAL NORMS 151 (2000).
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and the “severity” of the stakes would influence the level of the emergence
of custom.146 If the parties interact with high frequency for low stakes,
custom may still forge workable natural rules.147
In the categories of bait-and-switch practices that I examine in Part III,
the parties are typically asymmetrical, often with a retailer-consumer relationship,148 which likely attracts some of the regulatory attention. The asymmetric power imbalance should concern regulators. With traditional bait
and switch, regulators focus on dominant retailers or aggressive sales representatives making big-ticket sales to consumers.149 This would be a “low
frequency, high severity” transactional zone. We would not expect custom
to emerge here naturally because the seller’s interest in preserving the relationship is low, hence the need for heavier paternalistic regulation.
The carve-out exception for retail grocers within bait and switch, also discussed in Part III.A.4, typically sits in a “high-frequency, low severity”
zone.150 Custom would be expected to emerge naturally, if consumers are freer to break from a consensual relationship within this repeat-player environment.151 A weak bait-and-switch rule ultimately emerged in this sector because less formal custom is more likely to prevent bait-and-switch mischief.152
With free offers, asymmetry should be expected because this is a marketing tactic large retailers deploy. All sorts of permutations of transactions along the frequency and severity dimensions can occur. As I describe
in Part III.B, the custom and tradition of free-offer tactic is largely preserved by regulation, and tempered by disclosure.153 The preservation of
the seller’s custom naturally accrues to the benefit of the seller, yielding
an inequitable outcome that also may fail to advance welfare.
The 2009 changes in credit card regulation discussed in Part III.C may
have resulted from a dramatic change in underlying norms. Bank issuers
and cardholders have asymmetric roles in the transactional relationship.
Before 2009, whenever a credit card customer initiated a relationship with a
bank, the bank had more subsequent ability to raise rates through aggressive
146

Epstein, supra note 108, at 12–13.
See id. at 13.
148
Other examples include a bank/cardholder or school/student relationship.
149
See, e.g., infra Part III.A.1.
150
See infra Part III.A.4. If consumers are locked into a less competitive retail grocery
marketplace, as one might find in low-income areas, the assumptions about custom might
differ. The zone might be “high frequency, high severity,” as the important food purchases
are concentrated and spent among fewer sellers.
151
See infra Part III.A.4.
152
See infra Part III.A.4.
153
See infra Part III.B.
147
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tactics.154 This debtor-creditor relationship could be characterized as high
frequency—and as bank tactics became more aggressive and as debt balances ballooned, increasingly high severity. The gap between expected
custom and the regulated environment widened. This may provide a norms
or custom-based explanation for why the law changed. Norms, mores, and
associated customs can rise and fall quickly.155
Law school merit scholarships, as I explore in Part III.C.2, presented a
novel puzzle. To use the hunting metaphor of the Golden Gate student, if
the students were participating in “fair sport,” the relationship between the
school and student should appear to have more symmetry, and the emergent custom should suffice. If that were true, no corrective regulation
about disclosure156 or other reforms would have been needed. The students
at Golden Gate claimed that they did not know that they were in a hunting
game. If we accept the notion that they were in a “turkey shoot,” the relationship between student and law school was more asymmetrical—and
could be categorized as existing in a “low-frequency, high severity” zone,
if just examined as part of a singular transaction for a big-ticket purchase.
The “turkey shoot” scenario would beg stronger regulation.
Epstein’s framework for explaining where custom should be expected
to emerge in the absence of regulation shows us that when buyers and
sellers have asymmetric roles, there is not common custom. Imposing a
buyer’s custom or a seller’s custom on the market, as is the case in some
bait-and-switch circumstances, may bring the marketplace more in line
with our cultural expectations, but may not necessarily advance welfare.
The UCC drafting experience exemplifies one historic attempt to integrate existing customs into formal rules. Karl Llewellyn and the other reporters tried to reinforce custom through the Code, in an attempt not just
to make standards more certain, but also in an attempt to elevate trade
practices.157 That may provide a helpful comparative backdrop for exploring policymaking in the bait-and-switch context.
Next, I discuss the reinforcement of custom through formal means.
Generally, custom is more likely to emerge as a proper guide for regulation under certain conditions. Choosing to base law on custom—and choosing a custom—presents further challenges.

154

See infra Part III.C.
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 392 (1997).
156
See Standard 509(e), supra note 1.
157
Hillinger, supra note 133, at 1158.
155
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B. Reinforcing Custom Through Law
With regard to basing law on custom, Eric Posner observes that “the
relevant normative question ... is whether government can improve on social norms in particular cases, or harness them in order to achieve desired
policy outcomes at low cost.”158 Of course, as Posner notes, it can be challenging to identify what the norm or custom is, or to discern distinctions
between norms and mere conventions.159 Certainly, the question of “whose”
norm dominates may matter when the symmetry between parties that Epstein requires does not exist.160
Posner observes that “[s]cholars waver between praising custom as the
reflection of accumulating commercial wisdom, and condemning it as a
drag on commercial advance.”161 These wavering views can surface when
examining bait-and-switch regulation.
Traditional bait-and-switch regulation and free-offer regulation may reflect cultural and customary approaches that drag commercial advance, depending on one’s perspective. The commercial wisdom seems to be that baitand-switch tactics run counter to our acceptable trade customs. Our customs,
as embodied in our statutes and regulations, indicate that traditional bait-andswitch tactics are “dishonorable,”162 and this is reinforced by the law.
Free offers, on the other hand, are so ingrained in the commercial history of
the English-speaking world that the tradition has been largely enshrined even
though it may mislead consumers.163 With free offers, could custom be the
“drag on advance” about which Learned Hand warned?164
Finally, the CARD Act example shows us that sleepy custom can be jolted by a dramatic shift in the environment. By 2009, the previous decades’
prevailing customary practices (which were “severe” in Epstein’s parlance)
were upended by a populist wave that formally adopted consumer-friendly

158

POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 2, at xiii.
Id. “For [some] scholars, there is an important distinction between mere conventions,
which have no normative force, and social norms, which are sustained in part because they
reflect attitudes about what is the right thing to do.” Id.
160
See Epstein, supra note 108, at 11–12.
161
POSNER, supra note 145, at 165.
162
See ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 115, at 752.
163
See infra Part III.B. I have previously made a case against free offers, in part by detailing
the consumer cognitive error induced by the tactic. See generally Friedman, Free Offers, supra
note 23. The comments received by the Federal Trade Commission in 1969 reflected strong
arguments made mostly by advertisers and mass marketers supporting retention of the status
quo. See infra Part III.B.
164
The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
159
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norms over the incumbent norms.165 The custom that was ultimately enshrined with credit cards reflected rapidly accumulated wisdom—this custom displaced the previous custom. The law school merit scholarship dynamic also potentially resembles this scenario.
The law can also influence custom through its “expressive” function.166
Symbolically, laws can communicate values that influence behavior beyond
the zone where actors might be formally sanctioned for a violation.167 The
government can reinforce a “good” norm “merely by ‘expressing’ it.”168 Antismoking ordinances, for example, may have played an expressive role in
shifting smoking norms.169 Legislation may not reflect a consensus about a
behavior at the time of its passage.170 It may reflect a bare majority or even
something less than a majority.171 Legislation may instead reflect the magnification of the position of deeply committed or powerful interest groups
combined with a level of media interest and publicity. 172 The legislation
may reflect the composition of a lawmaking body out of step with public
opinion or may project a consensus that turns into a norm or custom.173
Regulation crafted through administrative procedure may be even further
insulated and attenuated from public consensus. Richard McAdams’s thesis
is that people prefer the esteem of others, and that norms emerge as people
pursue this esteem. 174 Creating a law enhances the notion that there is a
norm or custom to pursue that will maximize esteem.175
That said, this expressive function of the law that embodies and expresses norm and custom only has a positive effect on welfare if the norm
or custom is the “correct” one. As noted, law can reinforce customs that
reflect the past, putting the brakes on advancement.176 The law can also
reinforce controversial norms or customs. The debate about marijuana legalization can be largely viewed through this prism. Would the decriminalization of marijuana telegraph a new norm or new custom? Would it
increase recreational usage? Those that oppose legalization efforts argue
that decriminalization would reset the express cultural taboo and reduce the
165

See infra Part III.C.1.
McAdams, supra note 155, at 391, 397–408.
167
Id. at 391.
168
Id. at 397–98.
169
Id. at 404–07.
170
Id. at 403.
171
See McAdams, supra note 155, at 401.
172
Id. at 402–03.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 355–65.
175
Id. at 397–407.
176
See supra Part II.
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risk that marijuana use would lead to a loss of esteem of others.177 Marijuana legalization would not merely remove the legal sanction; it would diminish the social sanction.178
The legal ban on traditional bait-and-switch tactics may serve an expressive function and elevate commercial behavior. One could ponder
about whether the law produced the custom or vice versa, but the term bait
and switch is a powerful pejorative that describes tactics that travel beyond the legal definition. 179 The expressive function of bait-and-switch
regulation in credit cards may signal to banks, for example, that a mandate
toward disclosure and transparency of terms supports a new norm for the
industry to embrace rather than fight. The expressive function of bait-andswitch norms in other areas may spill over and affect the ultimate outcome of
the nature of law school merit scholarship offers. Bait-and-switch regulation
as a concept could give license to the public to identify other commercial behaviors that should be taboo.
If reinforced by commercial regulation, the economic impact of the
law will reflect the impact of the custom. If a regulation rooted in custom
(or notions of fairness) fails to advance welfare, the embrace of the values
behind the custom will come at a social cost.
C. Custom, Norms, and Efficiency
Do naturally arising customs generate welfare? Would formal adoption
of customs be necessarily efficient? According to Eric Posner, “the view
that social practices and norms are efficient or adaptive in some way—is
empirically false and methodologically sterile.”180 Steven Shavell and Louis
Kaplow note that norms often correspond with values of fairness, not in
177

See, e.g., Robert L. Dupont, Why We Should Not Legalize Marijuana, Marijuana &
Money, CNBC (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/36267223/Why_We_Should_Not
_Legalize_Marijuana/.
178
Id.; see Robert MacCoun & Peter Reuter, Evaluating Alternative Cannabis Regimes,
178 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 123, 123–24, 126–27 (2001). MacCoun and Reuter link
marijuana legalization to difficulties with partial legalization of other vices. Id.
179
For an example of the FTC misusing bait-and-switch language broadly in public
communications, see Press Release, Ticketmaster and TicketsNow Settle FTC Charges of
Deceptive Sales Tactics, Refunds for Springsteen Concertgoers Provided; FTC Warns
Other Ticket Resellers, Federal Trade Comm’n (Feb. 18, 2010) (“The Federal Trade
Commission today announced it has settled charges that Ticketmaster and its affiliates used
deceptive bait-and-switch tactics to sell event tickets to consumers.”). Note that although
the press release uses “bait-and-switch” language, the complaint filed in the Northern
District of Illinois does not use any bait-and-switch language. See Complaint at 13, F.T.C.
v. Ticketmaster, LLC (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 10 Civ. 01093).
180
POSNER, supra note 145, at 172.
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promotion of welfare, which may explain why socially attractive feelings
about fairness can trump arguments to promote efficiency.181 They provide
further warning for policymakers that “social norms did not arise for the
purpose of guiding formal policy analysis.”182
Below, I examine the regulation of commercial customs associated with
bait-and-switch tactics. As noted, some of these regulations appear to reflect
a collective social custom, some the sellers’ custom, some an evolving social norm. If one accepts that these regulations reflect custom, it is difficult
to say whether they are efficient or whether they even strive for efficiency.
Eric Posner suggests that:
norms ... should be understood as descriptions of equilibrium behavior in
games in which people with private information interact with each other.
Casual analysis of these games shows that social value will not necessarily
be maximized and that state intervention can potentially improve payoffs
for the players. Of course, whether state intervention really will make people
better off, rather than worse off, depends heavily on circumstances.183

Circumstances differ across categories of bait and switch that I explore
next. Ultimately, state intervention that corrects or reinforces norms may
or may not lead to welfare gains. This is not a new dilemma for those examining the role and impact of regulation.
III. ANALYZING BAIT-AND-SWITCH TYPOLOGIES
Why do we regulate certain trade practices that resemble bait and switch
and not others? Is the purpose to advance welfare by simply eliminating deception? Or is the purpose also to halt a “race to the bottom” that would create a shark-tank marketplace replete with “turkey shoots”? Do regulators
simply normatively reject these practices as “dishonorable”? Do regulators
intend to send a more general expressive message to the market about deception? The common theme throughout these questions is whether custom
181

Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 1035.
[W]e would expect that notions of fairness, which correspond to social
norms, will sometimes serve as helpful proxy tools for identifying legal
rules that raise individuals’ [welfare], but we would also predict that
there often will be an important divergence between rules that promote
fairness and those that advance [welfare]. When there is a divergence,
analysts should follow welfare economics rather than fairness-based
analysis ....

182

Id.
POSNER, supra note 145, at 179.
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explains the regulatory approach more than welfare advancement. Though it
is difficult to generalize an answer, exploring the different categories of bait
and switch can surface what drives or explains policy.
In this Part, I examine and analyze different forms of the practice, mostly through case studies. In Part III.A, I examine traditional bait-and-switch
regulation, as the FTC defines and enforces it,184 and conclude that norms
and customs play a dominant role in driving the regulatory approach. In
Part III.B, I discuss free offers, which lure consumers with a tempting promise in order to induce them to pay for something else, and conclude that
the cultural norms and customs prevail over welfare concerns, leaving the
trade practice intact. I examine credit card rate switches in Part III.C and
compare the regulatory and legislative environment for banks with that of
law school merit scholarships, which some might argue operate in a similar manner. In Part III.D, I briefly glimpse at other common tactics that
walk up to the line of bait and switch, but feel consistent with custom and
norms and are, not surprisingly, lawful.
A. Traditional Bait and Switch
In Part III.A, I examine tactics that fall into the unlawful category of
bait and switch. I discuss specific examples of enforcement actions. I first
describe a highly disfavored flavor of bait and switch—the seller’s attempt
to switch a buyer to another offering after completing a transaction by disparaging the initial purchased offering. Next, I describe a slightly less aggressive, but still unlawful, flavor of bait and switch, wherein the buyer is
lured by the bait and the seller subsequently disparages the bait. I then focus in Part III.A.3 on the scenario where the “switcher” does not disparage
anything, but merely has no sincere intent to sell what was initially advertised. Finally, in Part III.A.4, I describe the FTC’s carve-out for bait and
switch in retail groceries and how the regulation evolved along with the
norms and customs of the day.
The common thread that I follow through all these specific illustrations
of bait and switch185 is that custom tends to prevail, whether consistent
with welfare advancement or not. Even when the language of economics is
used, as it is in retail grocery regulation, it seems to be used strategically,
selectively, and as a proxy for explaining the norms of the time.
184

Using examples referenced in JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES
223–28 (3d ed. 1991).
185
I drew from prototypical case examples selected in MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD,
CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 75 (5th ed. 2009).
AND MATERIALS
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1. Disparagement of an Already Purchased Offering
An extreme example of seller “insincerity” would be where the buyer
completes a purchase, and then the seller disparages the object of the original purchase and attempts to undo the deal in order to induce a different
transaction more favorable to the seller. The tactics employed by the home
improvement industry in the 1960s embraced this practice to the extreme.186
The FTC did not merely pursue enforcement. The Commission brought the
industry’s bait-and-switch tactics to the attention of Congress.187
The FTC action in All-State Industries of North Carolina v. FTC188 provides a basic illustration. All-State Industries involved a seller that would
first close contracts for aluminum siding with consumers, pitching a cheaper, lower grade of aluminum material.189 This cheaper grade of material
was heavily advertised by the seller in marketing materials, with little or
no mention of any higher grade of product.190 The sales strategy was for
the salesperson to generate interest for the cheap product through a variety
of gimmicks and promotions.191
The court described the sales process as “set forth in the sales force’s
training manual.”192 The All-State Industries salesperson would
attempt[] to pressure the prospect into signing a contract ... committing
him to the purchase of [the cheaper] articles but leaving blank the
monetary obligation. As soon as the contract is executed, the salesperson
brings out a sample of the [cheaper material] and points out deficiencies
in it, “whether real or imaginary”. The [more expensive, premium material]
is then shown in contrast, to the detriment of the [cheaper material.]
Whenever possible the [premium material] is then sold “at the highest
price obtainable from the individual customer”. The salesmen ... receive
no commission on [cheaper articles] but only on [premium] sales.193

This tactic is classic, traditional bait and switch. A transaction reaches fruition, and under the pressure of having made a commitment to a purchase,194 the customer feels compelled to switch to the “superior” product.
186

See Unfair Practices in the Home Improvement Industry and Amendments to the FTC
Act: Hearings on S.J. Res. 130, S. 3065 and S. 3066 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 90th
Cong. 1–2 (1968).
187
See All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc. v. FTC, 423 F.2d 423, 424 (4th Cir. 1970).
188
Id. at 426.
189
Id. at 424–25.
190
Id. at 424.
191
Id. at 425.
192
Id.
193
See 423 F.2d at 424–25.
194
The sunk-cost mindset may provide the primary pressure source.
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There is no doubt that with the aluminum sales process, the initial offer
was insincere and part of a deceptive scheme.
From a custom perspective, this level of dishonesty offended all marketplace sensibilities. This sales process expressly builds on deception and
outright lying. These aluminum-siding tactics could be described as legendarily outrageous,195 and unfair to consumers and any honest competitors.
The restoration of the norm through regulation and enforcement may
align with the result best suited to advancing welfare. The aluminum siding case provides an illustration where consumer cognition may be distorted at the time of the switch. The consumer is invested in the transaction
and may be malleable enough to agree to buy a product that they did not
need at a price that they might not have entertained without the tactic. The
key here is that the consumer has reached a commitment level with the
salesperson—and probably a connection of trust—that destroys the ability
to make a rational, welfare-advancing deal.
Epstein’s framework implies that custom in this particular market environment would not provide an efficient result. The seller (a large marketing organization with a detailed tactical sales strategy) and the homeowner are positioned asymmetrically in this transaction. The sale involves
a one-time transaction and a large-ticket item: a “low frequency,” “high
severity” zone. Legal sanction may be required where nonlegal sanctions
would fail. Here, imposing a legal structure serves an expressive function
to discourage poor market behavior, a welfare-advancement function, and
the purpose of reinforcing a strong social norm.
2. Disparagement of Bait
The classic bait-and-switch scenario begins with the seller’s disparagement of the initial advertised offering (the “bait”), and results in a switch to
a transaction that works to the seller’s favor. Direct, express disparagement
of an advertised item would certainly provide a basis for proving that the
initial offer was “insincere,”196 running against acceptable customary marketplace behavior. However, express disparagement is not a requirement. A
deliberate effort to switch the sale by simply contrasting the initial offering
with a superior offering can suffice to constitute unlawful deception.197
195

In fact, if one were to make a movie about bait-and-switch practices and their
regulation, this would be the industry. See TIN MEN (Touchstone Pictures 1987) (illustrating
the sales practices described in the All-State Industries case and accompanying efforts to
curb them).
196
See 16 C.F.R. § 238.0 (2012).
197
16 C.F.R. § 238.4.
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Southern States Distributing Company198 involved a seller of big-ticket
household improvement items like carpeting, siding, and swimming pools.199
Southern States promoted less expensive items through advertisements,
but instructed the sales representatives, who personally visited homes, to
present premium versions of a product alongside the lower-quality advertised product, typically with the use of physical models.200 The premium
items were displayed in a dramatically superior and more attractive manner than the “bait” that generated the initial interest.201 The FTC ultimately
found that
the models ... distorted the real differences between bait items and switch
items, to the detriment of the bait items. For instance, the deluxe pool
model came in a black carrying case with a plexiglass cover, painted,
landscaped, and filled with blue ersatz water, while the advertised pool
model was made of unpainted wood, contained in an unpainted wooden
suitcase, and came without simulated water, swimming pool ladder, or
the same sort of luxurious landscape. Similarly, inspection and comparison of other models of advertised and deluxe products indicates that the
deluxe model was invariably packaged to appear comparatively more
attractive than it would if simply placed or installed side by side with the
economy item in the same setting.202

The FTC concluded that although it was difficult to discern whether
consumers decided to switch from the advertised cheaper product to the
more expensive one due to quality, or due to the distorted mode of presentation, “[i]t [was] clear ... that consumers were induced by display of these
models to depart from their previous intentions to purchase the advertised
economy product and accept the more expensive one.”203 The FTC deemed
these “embellishments” misleading.204
The practices described in Southern States might appear a degree less
oppressive than the All-State Industries example above. Consumer cognitive error is still being induced, but perhaps the sunk costs are not as deep
as when a contract has already been signed and a transactional relationship
has formed. Nonetheless, just as in All-State Industries, the norm against
the bait practices was violated and the transgression was corrected by the
FTC through formal means. The social welfare impact in a case like this
198

See In re S. States Distrib. Co., 83 F.T.C. 1126 (1973).
Id. at 2, 8.
200
Id. at 8–9.
201
Id. at 10.
202
Id. at 31 (internal citations omitted).
203
Id.
204
See S. States Distrib. Co., 83 F.T.C. at *32.
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one would depend on the degree of error that the consumer might make.
The very same welfare concerns raised in the Alpha Autos hypothetical
scenario in Part I.B would also appear here.
The next flavor of traditional bait and switch does not involve any express disparagement, but rather the plain use of an insincere offering to
generate interest in a different transaction. In this next instance, the tactics
ruled unlawful began to brush against other aggressive, but lawful, retail
marketing tactics. Unlike the previous two illustrations, in a case where
tactics are not as explicit, the FTC must rely more upon the actual outcomes of the marketing tactics rather than the mechanics per se.
3. Bait and Switch Without Disparagement
The FTC can question sincerity of the initial offer even without any
measure of disparagement of the initial offer.205 If the larger picture shows
that the initial offer is insincere, the FTC can deem the practices of the
seller deceptive.206 Pursuit of these less obvious cases, like the next one,
illuminates the norms that the FTC implicitly tries to promote. Within the
context of its time, one can see how certain social trends supported a pronounced paternalistic effort to improve marketplace custom.
In 1966, the FTC filed a complaint against Leon A. Tashof, the operator
of New York Jewelry Company, a retail store in urban Washington, D.C.207
Tashof, the sole proprietor, “advertis[ed], [and] offered for sale ... various ...
goods, including ... watches, radios, rings, furniture, cookware, eyeglasses,
television sets and other electrical appliances ....” 208 The commissioner
found that Tashof’s customers had low incomes and relied on credit for a
substantial amount of store purchases.209 The store’s advertising and marketing tactics aggressively targeted consumers with credit difficulties.210 At
205

16 C.F.R. §§ 238.0–1 (2012).
16 C.F.R. § 238.2.
207
See In re Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. 1361, 1361 (1968), aff’d, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
208
Id. at 1364.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 1373. The store’s practices with respect to credit appeared predatory, and
that appearance may have informed the whole of the FTC’s decision. The store handed
cards out on the street that read: “Because We Appreciate Your Business, Mr. Tash, the
Mgr., Says: I’ll give credit to everybody even if you never had credit, Lost your credit, or
others have turned you down.” Id. at 1374. The store also freely handed out “credit cards”
that read: “Certifies that BEARER is an AAA-1 Preferred Customer; Instant Credit—No
Money Down; Make Your Own Terms; This card certifies that you have a preferred
credit rating and attests to your character excellence.” Id.
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specific issue in the FTC’s complaint were the store’s practices with respect
to the advertising and selling of eyewear and related services.211
The store had repeatedly placed advertisements in newspapers that
were typified by the following presentation:
DISCOUNT EYE GLASSES MADE WHILE YOU WAIT
Price includes lenses, frames and case—from $7.50 complete212

Radio advertising reinforced the notion that the complete package for eyeglasses would cost $7.50:
I’ll protect your eyes and protect your pocketbook * * * eyeglass
service at economy prices * * * complete eyeglasses, including lenses
and frame, for as low as $7.50 * * * .... Oculists’ prescriptions filled at
low economy prices * * * be thrifty * * * protect your eyes and protect
your pocketbook at the thrifty economical discount department of the
New York Jewelry Company.213

The FTC concluded that this advertising did not mean to communicate a
“bona fide offer” to sell eyeglasses at a price significantly below that of
competing retailers, 214 as part of a bait-and-switch scheme. 215 The store
conditioned the offer on the purchase of an eye examination from the
store’s oculist, or required customers to bring a prescription with them.216
These tactics apparently generated confusion for customers because practically nobody paid $7.50 for a pair of eyeglasses on a standalone basis.
Out of 1400 pairs of eyeglasses sold by the store from 1964 through 1966,
ninety-nine percent were sold at prices exceeding $7.50,217 “with or without an optical prescription, [and not] a single $7.50 sale was made any
time regardless of any extra charge for an eye examination.”218 Instead,
consumers were buying eyeglasses from the store at dramatically higher
prices or as part of a different bundle.219
Tashof argued that these factual findings were immaterial, arguing that
no evidence emerged that the store “disparaged” the alleged $7.50 bait
211

Id. at 1364.
Id.
213
See Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. at 1374.
214
Id at 1379.
215
Id. at 1375–79.
216
Id. at 1375–76.
217
The prices often well exceeded $7.50 per pair. Seventy-two percent of glasses were
sold at prices exceeding $39. Id.
218
Id.
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See Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. at 1377.
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eyeglasses in an attempt to switch customers to more expensive lines.220
The FTC noted that though disparagement was indeed a frequently employed tactic to switch the consumer to a different product, it was not a
necessary element for proving that a seller engaged in a bait and switch.221
Bait and switch, the FTC argued, was more encompassing. What mattered
was that “an offer [was] made which [was] not bona fide in that the seller
[had] no intention to sell the advertised product at the advertised price but
... [used] the advertisement as a ‘come-on.’”222
The FTC considered other factors in ruling that the store had engaged
in bait and switch, including the “economic feasibility” of the offering for
the seller and the level of sales for the advertised offer.223 On its face, the
totality of the entire scheme added up to evidence of bait and switch.224
Custom and norms were expressly involved in this case. The hearing
officer in the initial (now reversed) dismissal of the Tashof matter noted:
“This case was founded upon the premise ... that the problems involved in
the complaint required that new ground needed to be plowed in order to
right the wrongs of a part of our economic system particularly as they affect the low-income class of our society....”225 In dismissing the broad deception claims, the officer noted further that Congress had been wrestling
with legislation about these sorts of practices for some time.226 The progressive norms were evolving into formal rules at the time of the Tashof
case, and this evolution literally entered the narrative of the case. Further,
the ultimate conclusions reached by the FTC and enforced by the D.C.
Circuit aspired to raise commercial standards. They took the customs
prevalent in the broader marketplace and used them as the benchmark to
raise the standards in this low-income market.
Tashof effectively demonstrates the imposition of a new norm, and as
noted in Part II, such an imposition of custom could potentially trade off
advancements in fairness for a loss of efficiency.227 In drafting Article 2 of
the UCC, Karl Llewellyn attempted to elevate practices by appealing to
custom, but at the same time, believed that application of custom would
elevate practices, rather than reinforce what was in place. 228 In The T.J.
220
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Hooper, Judge Learned Hand cautioned that reliance on custom as a commercial standard could be a drag on advancement.229 Here, had the incumbent custom been adopted, the standard for sincerity in the marketplace would
be much lower than adopting the retailer standards in the broader market.
In assessing the social norms and customs of the Tashof case, a parallel appears in the well-known case about the doctrine of unconscionability that also
emerged from the District of Columbia, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co.230 Not only did Tashof and Williams emerge from the same city at roughly
the same time, they emerged from the same Seventh Street neighborhood.231
In Williams, the plaintiff had entered into a consumer installment sales
agreement with a retailer that put her in the position of suffering a substantial forfeiture for a default.232 The court recognized the validity of the unconscionability defense for plaintiffs situated like Williams and remanded
the case accordingly.233
In rejecting Williams’s claim, the lower court, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, expressed a stance about the morals of the
marketplace, but did not see fit to recognize the defense. “‘We cannot
condemn too strongly appellee’s conduct. It raises serious questions of
sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings.’”234 The D.C. Circuit
repeated this concern but went on to argue that a statutory basis was not
required to defeat the agreement.235 This norm, condemning the marketplace conduct of the retailer, would be enforced and enshrined through the
ruling. Just as in Tashof, the emerging norm would be enforced.
The marketplace behavior on Seventh Street in Washington, D.C., in the
1960s appeared to involve routine employment of aggressive marketing tactics,
229

The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
231
The New York Jewelry Company operated at 719 Seventh Street, NW. See In re
Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. 1361, 1361 (1968), aff’d, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company’s place of business was at Seventh and L Street,
NW. Walker Thomas Furniture Sign, WASHINGTON KALEIDOSCOPE (Sept. 22, 2012, 6:08
PM), http://dckaleidoscope.wordpress.com/2009/03/13/walker-thomas-furniture-sign/. These
locations are a six-minute walk from each other, as confirmed through Google Maps. Walking
Directions from 719 7th Street, NW, Washington, DC to 7th Street, NW & L Street, NW,
Washington, DC, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Get Directions” hyperlink;
select “Walking Directions” button; then search “A” for “719 7th Street, NW, Washington,
DC” and search “B” for “7th Street, NW & L Street, NW, Washington, DC”; then follow
“Get Directions” hyperlink).
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See Williams, 350 F.2d at 447.
233
Id. at 450.
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Id. at 448 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916
(D.C. Ct. App. 1964)).
235
Id. at 448–49.
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largely through the use of credit.236 Regulators and courts would attempt to
change these dynamics through the reinforcement of new norms—norms that
valued integrity of commercial behavior and consumer dignity for the
economically disadvantaged over aggregate economic considerations. 237
Confusing, disingenuous tactics would no longer be endorsed.
Williams raised the potential welfare impact of elevating standards.
Judge Danaher, in his dissent, urged caution in deploying unconscionability
and imposing a paternalistic norm to benefit those on “relief.”238 He implicitly argued that the imposition of the norm might have deleterious consequences for welfare: “Many relief clients may well need credit, and certain
business establishments will take long chances on the sale of items, expecting their pricing policies will afford a degree of protection commensurate
with the risk.”239
In Tashof, consumers were being served by a store that catered to a
credit-poor market segment. Perhaps, one could alternatively argue that the
aggressive nature of the sales tactics yielded more competition on Seventh
Street, lowering prices and broadening product availability. The FTC only
compared the pricing of the eyeglasses sold against the prices advertised.
But if the prices for the goods sold were below that (or competitive with)
other sellers in the market, were consumers injured? 240 Were consumers
diverted from better alternatives? The FTC did not entertain that inquiry,
and it appears that that argument was never formally made. The underlying
narrative of norms and insincere behavior prevailed over any discussion of
welfare in Tashof. Judge Danaher’s specific concerns about consumers were
swept aside in favor of instilling norms of sincere behavior.
Ultimately, these cases broadcasted that it was unacceptable for sellers
to compete for business using these tactics, and that new norms needed to
be enforced. The Tashof case, reviewed in conjunction with Williams, presents the larger debate about bait and switch. What are the norms? Should
norms be reinforced through formal rules? What is the tradeoff, if any, between enforcing this paternalistic custom and welfare advancement?
236
The New York Jewelry Company engaged in aggressive credit plans, too. This was
incorporated into the FTC’s larger complaint. See In re Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. 1361,
1366–70 (1968), aff’d, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
237
See Epstein, supra note 108, at 1–2.
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Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (Danaher, J., dissenting).
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Id.
240
Perhaps competitors would be injured by loss of market share to the more aggressive
marketer, but that would present a different issue. As noted supra Part I, Akerlof would
predict that bad practices would drive out good. There may be room for competitors to seek
remedies through the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976), or similar state statutes
addressing injury from false advertising, but it may be more expensive to litigate than
simply to cooperate.
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4. The Retail Grocery Carve-Out
The exceptional rules for retail grocers also provide grist for understanding the roles of custom and norms. At first, stricter rules were directed at the
industry to elevate the commercial behavior, reflecting the norms of the
day. 241 Two decades later, the rules were weakened, also reflecting the
norms of the day—but the norms had changed.242
In the late 1960s, the FTC began to scrutinize the marketing and pricing behavior of supermarkets, with a focus on low-income areas.243 Advertised low-price items (specials) concerned the FTC.244 In a 1966 study, the
FTC found that specials lowered the average price for grocery store merchandise by five percent and that customers who could take “full advantage” of the promotions could reduce their grocery spending by ten
percent. 245 For aggressive, cost-conscious consumers, saving this much
money on the food budget would be quite significant. However, the FTC
study showed that in many cases, and certainly in the aggregate, that these
potential savings were under-realized due to product unavailability or
simple failure to match the in-store prices to the advertising.246
The study of supermarkets in Washington, D.C., revealed that twentythree percent of advertised specials were not in stock in the low-income
area stores, and in eleven percent of high-income locations.247 The numbers in San Francisco were lower in both categories, but significant nonetheless: seven percent and five percent.248 In both cities, the rate of mispricing of the offer when compared with the advertisement averaged seven
to eight percent, with three-quarters of the mispricing skewing above the
advertised price.249
The FTC Guides Against Bait Advertising, adopted in 1959, already required that all sellers keep adequate stock on hand to meet the demand of
the items that they promoted.250 Industry-specific recommendations for retail grocery, however, were made in the study.251 Along with suggestions
241
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about price posting and modification to “raincheck” policies, the study recommended that grocery stores adopt additional controls and improve supervision over individual outlets.252
To establish a sense of the role of evolving norms in formally changing
trade practices, reading the broader context of the FTC’s Economic Report on
Food Chain Selling proves instructive. Once again, the focus coincidentally
returns to 1960s District of Columbia.253 The study expressed general concerns about food distribution in low-income urban areas, noting that suburban
areas did not suffer from the same problems.254 The Report noted that consumers in low-income urban areas transact in retail outlets that are “small,
less efficient, and higher[-]price[d]” that sell “lower quality merchandise[,]
and [offer] fewer services” out of “old and ... shabby” facilities.255
From an economic standpoint, in the District of Columbia, retail food
store competition was highly concentrated at the time of the study, with
the top four players holding eighty-three percent of the “inner-city” market
share.256 In San Francisco, by comparison, the top four players controlled
thirty-three percent of the market.257 The study partially attributes the mispricing and product unavailability problems to the absence of competition.258
This conjecture would offer an economic justification for providing a mechanism to change the norms and customs and elevate the marketing behavior of
the grocers. During this era, the antitrust division of the FTC litigated the
problems of concentration in the retail grocery sector, and then promulgated
industry merger guidelines.259 But this refinement to the bait-and-switch rule
attempted to correct economic behavior on a more micro level.260
In an attempt to elevate commercial custom, the FTC promulgated a
rule directed toward retail food store advertising in 1971.261 The so-called
252
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“Unavailability Rule” gave retailers rigorous administrative tasks to ensure
that their inventory management and advertising practices passed muster.262
The rule required that for a defense “against a charge of failure to have
items available” the stores would need to “maintain[] records showing that
the advertised items were timely ordered and delivered in quantities sufficient to meet reasonably anticipated demand.”263
In the two decades following the study and enactment of the new guide,
technological advancements dramatically altered the industry’s approach
toward inventory and labeling and pricing controls. The first Universal
Product Code scanner was introduced in 1974.264 By the mid-1980s, half of
the supermarkets in the United States deployed scanning systems.265 This
technology should have made inventory management and pricing controls
less expensive to administer. In 1986, however, another report by the FTC
concluded that, in spite of this advancement, compliance with the 1971 Unavailability Rule was inordinately costly and might even injure consumers
by making grocery items more expensive.266
Upon revising the Unavailability Rule in 1989, the FTC noted that
“overall unavailability rates have been reduced by about 50 percent” since
the introduction of the Rule in 1971.267 The FTC’s 1986 study revealed that
although the technological advancements in “computerization” contributed
to the reduction of unavailability, the measures taken to comply with the
Rule (along with enforcement measures in the 1970s) were the primary
drivers of the reduction.268 The FTC did not stop to pat its institutional self
on the back for this accomplishment, however, and took a close look at the
costs of this reduction, ultimately restructuring the rule.269
The FTC found that food retailers had taken an extremely defensive
posture after the 1971 Rule was promulgated. The record revealed that
“most food retailers feel compelled to take precautions that they would
otherwise not take in the ordinary course of business to avoid inadvertent
262
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violations of the Rule.”270 The retailers took “extraordinary measures” to
comply, “includ[ing] maintaining inventory cushions over and above what
is needed to meet reasonably anticipated demand, performing additional
checks of retail shelves, and creating and maintaining records of their cumulative monitoring activities.”271 When assessing the net impact of the
Rule, the FTC concluded “the costs of complying with [the] Rule greatly
exceed[ed] the benefits.”272 The cost-to-benefit ratio of the Rule was characterized by FTC staff as “overwhelming” and ranged anywhere from
2.5:1 to almost 8:1.273
The revised 1989 Rule afforded bait-and-switch defenses that were
much simpler for retailers to avail themselves, but not nearly as direct as
requiring closer recordkeeping.274 The FTC, after the 1989 Rule, would
not effectively compel the tracking of inventory in the way that the 1971
Rule did.275 The 1989 Rule offers looser avenues of protection for retail
grocers attempting to comply with FTC guidelines, focusing on the stores’
ordering programs, raincheck policies, and willingness to discount substitute goods or offer other compensation upon stocking out.276
The 1986 report and subsequent rule change did not arrive without controversy, however.277 Federal Trade Commissioner Andrew J. Strenio, Jr.,
saw no “net consumer benefit” to the rule amendment, despite the “intuitive
appeal” of the revisions.278 On the other hand, Commissioner Terry Calvani
argued in a short but strong dissent that the FTC should have repealed the
entire rule. “[I]n the highly competitive grocery store business, where consumers return week after week to the same store, any supermarket that frustrates its customers through unavailability of advertised items will not long
keep those customers .... [E]xisting market forces adequately police unavailability ... therefore, no [FTC] rule is necessary ....”279
Though the FTC did not go as far as repeal, this change did present a
regulatory zigzag. From the 1960s through the late 1980s, regulators
cloaked their approaches in economics from start to finish. The 1969 FTC
study was chock full of data, as were the findings that led to the 1989 rule
270
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change. 280 It could be discerned that the politics driving the 1969 Rule
promulgation were about broader social norms, and the relevant economic
data was drawn upon to support those politics, whereas the 1989 revision
reflected the deregulatory atmosphere of the 1980s. In the 1969 report, the
urban challenges of the time were a paramount part of the introduction:
Food pricing in inner-city poverty areas is a particularly critical question
.... [G]rievances concerning unfair commercial practices were significant
in over half of the [recently] riot-torn cities studied. The strength of this
[retail grocery stores] grievance in Washington, D.C., poverty areas was
revealed in a recent survey which showed that nearly nine out of every 10
black persons interviewed complained of the poor quality and high prices
of the food available ....281

Once again, the commercial customs and practices of 1960s Washington,
D.C., coincidentally emerge as an inspiration for setting new rules. The
District of Columbia of this era could be viewed perhaps as a proxy for the
commercial culture in the urban environment throughout the United States.
With the support of underlying economic data, the retail grocery store rule
was first implemented.
Political norms also likely played a role in the FTC’s moderation of the
rule in the late 1980s. To generalize, a deregulatory political ethos and culture
was expressed throughout the Reagan presidency.282 Deregulation was certainly in the political air, and President Reagan’s emphasis on “paperwork
reduction”283 certainly was, too.
280
The 1969 Report collected data on “the general organization of food markets in
metropolitan areas” and “survey findings on chainstore pricing in Washington, D.C., and
San Francisco metropolitan areas....” ECONOMIC REPORT ON FOOD CHAIN SELLING, supra
note 33, at 13–20, 25–39. See generally Amendment to Trade Regulation Rule Concerning
Retail Food Store Advertising and Marketing Practices, 54 Fed. Reg. 35,456 (Aug. 28,
1989) (employing numerous private and public empirical studies).
281
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uses, and it should be allowed to do so without excessive paperwork and
restrictions. That is why privatization, deregulation, and private sector initiatives have been important elements of my economic program. I believe in
the inherent dynamism of the private sector, and I believe that the most
constructive thing government usually can do is simply get out of the way.
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The zigzag reflects that the social norms and prevailing culture drove
the regulatory scheme. The sources of the proffered economic justification
varied, but the evolution of the rule closely tracked the evolution of the
political environment.
By the 1960s, it appeared that the FTC was, in effect, making the argument that the market structure in low-income grocery retail generated asymmetry between grocer and consumer.284 The absence of competition proved
unfavorable for the emergence of custom, which created the need for closer
regulation. Nonlegal sanctions from low-income consumers to correct baitand-switch tactics were unavailable because dominant stores left few alternatives for consumers. The upper-income segment saw more competition, with
consumers faring better on availability and pricing. Perhaps custom and nonlegal sanction for unavailability, pricing, and other areas worked because
consumers had more choices and were more mobile. Nonetheless, the FTC
rule needed to address the entire sector. By the late 1980s, the FTC took the
position that competition would ultimately provide the solution, substituting
a new set of values in place of the 1960s cultural concern.
In sum, the desire to elevate marketplace standards provoked the FTC to
regulate the supermarkets more tightly in the 1960s. The enthusiasm for deregulation possibly provoked changes in the other direction in the 1980s.
Economics regarding the urban food market were cited to support the former change; the economics of supporting the regulation were cited to support the latter. One could surmise that the political narrative—and the norm
of the day—may have mattered more than the economics, and if not, then at
least as much. Norms and marketplace values trumped welfare concerns.285
B. Free Offers
I include “free offers” in the bait-and-switch family because in this instance, the seller lures the consumer to an offering of something free—in
order to lead them to transact for something that is not free. The consumer
is effectively baited in and switched, albeit in a different way. Free offers
are lawful promotions if sellers meet certain criteria, and it is telling to explore why they remain lawful while traditional bait-and-switch tactics are
not. Here, history and custom appear to have a heavy influence on the outcome—not advancement of welfare.
The free offer has a long heritage and is well-established in commercial culture in the United States and elsewhere. 286 Since the nineteenth
284
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century, free offers have been a part of the landscape.287 The prototypical
free offer involved pubs, saloons, and grocery stores promoting free salty
food to lure in customers in the expectation that they would buy alcoholic
beverages.288 Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman’s famous aphorism, “[t]here’s
no such thing as a free lunch,”289 originates from this custom of sellers offering food that appeared free, but in fact was conditioned on or heavily
promoted another purchase.
Today, a free offer is lawful, provided that the conditions of the free offer are clearly disclosed.290 As the modern approach to modern free-offer
regulation evolved, at least one regulator noted a contradiction inherent in
permitting a seller to call an offering free while requiring them to disclose
that it is not—and perhaps some measure of insincerity.291 The custom that
triumphed in this debate was the notion that caveat emptor would largely
guide the use of the word “free.”292 Perhaps looming larger than that was
the well-established commercial custom of the free offer.
1. The Regulation
The FTC permits sellers to use the word “free” to induce a transaction,
provided that the seller adequately communicate why the offer in fact, has
a “catch.”293
When making “[f]ree” ... offers all the terms, conditions and obligations
upon which receipt and retention of the “[f]ree” item are contingent
should be set forth clearly and conspicuously at the outset of the offer
so as to leave no reasonable probability that the terms of the offer might
be misunderstood.294
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See Friedman, Free Offers, supra note 23, at 56.
293
For a detailed discussion, see id. at 53–55.
294
16 C.F.R. § 251.1(c) (2012).
288
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Under FTC guidelines about the “use of the word ‘free,’”295 a seller can label an offer “free” so long as nearby, the seller tells the consumer why it is
not free.296 This commercial tradition survived direct challenges in the first
half of the twentieth century. The current regulatory regime was effectively
cemented by the FTC in In re Walter J. Black,297 which involved the use of
the word “free” in the sale of novels through book clubs.298 Notably, in this
matter, norms and traditions were given weight by the FTC:299
The practice in question [use of the word free with full disclosure that the
free item is conditional on another purchase] is by no means new300 ... This
continuous use, however, in and of itself, is not reason enough for [the
FTC] to condone the practice if ... any law require[s] its discontinuance.
Absent such legislation, [no] ... administrative agency should take it upon
itself to change a business practice which has been so long prevalent ....301

In this case, the FTC refused to change a regulation that was firmly
rooted in tradition, regardless of welfare effects. Commissioner James Mead,
dissenting in Walter J. Black, seemed intuitively to grasp that the incumbent
regulatory approach enabled sellers to employ a deceptive bait and switch,
even though he did not use bait-and-switch language.302
As Mead wrote about the “free” books:
The ... books are either free or they are not free. They cannot be both.
The advertisements [represent that] the books are free. Elsewhere in the
advertisements is the statement which indicates that such books are not
free. At best, these statements are contradictory. One of the statements
must be contrary to fact. This is obviously the statement that the books
are free ....
A seller may not make one representation in one part of his advertisement and withdraw it in another part since there is no obligation on the
part of the customer to protect himself against such a practice by pursuing an advertisement to the bitter end.303

295

See Commission Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Representations, 16 C.F.R. § 251.1(e) (2012).
296
16 C.F.R. § 251.1(e).
297
In re Walter J. Black, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 225, 225 (1953).
298
Id. at 225.
299
See Friedman, Free Offers, supra note 23, at 65.
300
Walter J. Black, 50 F.T.C. at 232 (noting that this business practice “has been used
by businessmen ... for almost 100 years”).
301
Id. (emphasis added).
302
For an analysis of Mead’s dissent, see Friedman, Free Offers, supra note 23, at 67–68.
303
Walter J. Black, 50 F.T.C. at 239 (Mead, Comm’r, dissenting) (emphasis added)
(quoting Mead’s opinion in In re Book-of-the-Month Club, 50 F.T.C. 778 (1954)).
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Mead not only identified the contradiction inherent in the free-offer tradition, he called out one of the core elements of the advertising tactic. The
word “free” is used by sellers in advertisements to draw attention to an offer, only to reveal that the underlying deal is something different. The offeror is not sincerely desiring to provide the consumer with a gift; the offeror
is attempting to use the free offer as “bait” to capture the consumer’s attention to generate a transaction.
The majority in Walter J. Black had offered the notion that the custom
was prevalent, implying that consumers already had internalized the tactic
through absorption of the practice. 304 In an early free-offer case from
1925, John C. Winston Co. v. FTC,305 the Third Circuit firmly embraced
this notion in a case where the FTC attempted to crack down on tactics
involving the marketing of free encyclopedias associated with costly supplements.306 The Third Circuit pushed back on the FTC, stating that “[i]t is
conceivable that a very stupid person might be misled by this method ...
yet measured by ordinary standards of trade and by ordinary standards of
the intelligence of traders, we cannot discover that it amounts to an unfair
method of competition ....”307
Note that in the enforcement of traditional bait and switch, policymakers had been reluctant to embrace this notion of “ordinary standards of the
trade” and “intelligence of the traders.” There was no discussion anywhere
about the established tradition of bait and switch in the retail store, the
grocery, or the home products salesman pulling off tactics that would fool
“only the very stupid.” With free offers, however, this discussion was explicit. The free offer form of bait and switch was deemed acceptable, in
spite of its internal contradiction and potential for deception.
Free offers tamper with the consumer’s ability to assess true prices of
goods, with the value of bundled offerings, and with the consumer’s sociological impulse to reciprocate when given what appears to be a gift.308 The
cognitive error that can be induced by these factors could diminish welfare.
In this instance, tradition triumphs over economics and perhaps other moral
marketplace values.

304

See id. at 234 (majority opinion).
John C. Winston Co. v. FTC, 3 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1925).
306
See id. at 962.
307
Id. (emphasis added).
308
See Friedman, Free Offers, supra note 23, at 72–73.
305
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These other values were expressed in the comments provided to the
FTC during the two-year notice and comment period309 that led the adoption of the modern Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Representations in 1971.310 The comments show that industry strongly
backed the status quo, arguing that consumers enjoyed and benefitted from
this promotional technique.311 The few consumer groups that participated
in the comment period attacked the rule using moral language that critiqued the norm. The Council on Consumer Information312 returned to the
basic question, “If I can’t get it without buying something, how can anyone by any stretch of the imagination call it free?”313 and “encouraged ...
the commissioners to do everything in [their] power to encourage morality
in the marketplace.”314 The Council concluded with this kicker: “I think it
is too bad the marketers have corrupted the definition of the word free and
I will be disappointed if the FTC continues to allow this corruption.”315
However, one wishes to characterize the free-offer regulations—either a
long prevalent business practice that would only “confuse the very stupid” or
an immoral “corruption”—the FTC continued to allow the practice. Custom
and the failure to win the argument on moral grounds trumped welfare advancement in this instance.
309

See Federal Trade Commission Guide Concerning Use of Word “Free” and Similar
Representations: Notice of Opportunity to Present Written Views, Suggestions, or Objections, 34 Fed. Reg. 5444 (Mar. 20, 1969).
310
16 C.F.R. § 251 (2012). The author thanks Professor Chris Hoofnagle for sharing the fruits
of his Freedom of Information Act request to the FTC. The comments are on file with the author.
311
Typifying the bulk of the comments, the Association of National Advertisers
(ANA) argued that the consumer understood the tradition:
Free offers and similar representations have always ranked high in consumer
favor among the promotional techniques commonly employed .... [I]t is only
because of the strong positive consumer response to such offers that national
advertisers choose to invest in them. In denying the consuming public the
benefits of these forms of promotion, the Commission would in fact be acting
contrary to the interests of those it is charged with protecting.
Comment to Federal Trade Commission, Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers (May 15, 1969) (on file
with author).
312
The Council appears to be governed by academics in the field of agricultural
economics and home economics. See Comment to Federal Trade Commission, Publisher of
the Journal of Consumer Affairs (Mar. 27, 1969) (on file with author).
313
The Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Chicago made similar points in its
recommendations. “1. It should not be accepted if a person, in order to receive the free article,
is placed under any contractual obligation or commitment. 2. A person should not be required
to sign for, or purchase any other product, in order to receive the article described as ‘FREE.’”
Comment to Federal Trade Commission, Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Chicago (Apr. 25,
1969) (on file with author).
314
Id. (emphasis added).
315
Id. (emphasis added).

2013]

EXPLAINING “BAIT-AND-SWITCH” REGULATION

625

Distinct from free offers, but similar in nature, are advertising and
sales tactics that lure consumers with low-priced initial offerings, only to
have that price or rate hiked once locked in. I label these practices “teasers,” as they tend to unfold in a time sequence. They distinguish themselves from free offers, which involve a more instant bait and switch because the free offer and associated condition are absorbed by the consumer
almost at the same time.
Arguably, consumers are more tightly tied into relationships with teaser credit card companies than they are with aggressive retail outlets. A retail customer can physically walk out even if there is a psychological pull,
but a credit card customer cannot easily escape paying a new higher rate
on a large balance.
Even though teasers are not covered by classic bait-and-switch regulation, I also include them in the bait-and-switch family, just like free offers.
Consumers who have been teased by a credit card may feel “bait-andswitched.” The students at risk of losing their merit scholarships after their
first year at Golden Gate University Law School articulated exactly that
about their commercial relationship with the school. Beyond the formal
walls of bait and switch, understanding which teasers have been held in
disfavor by policymakers and which have not can further our understanding of the role of norms, custom, and welfare advancement.
C. Teasers: Credit Cards and Scholarships
In discussing teasers, I first describe the evolution and sudden regulation of the credit card industry. As I note, credit cards play a significant
role in our consumer economy. Although the industry is well established,
cultural change led to sudden changes in the credit card legal regime. I
link and compare the credit card example with the complicated regime of
law school merit scholarships. Some of these scholarship-losing law students described a similar feeling to that of credit card holders. Regardless
of disclosures about retention of the scholarship being dependent on maintaining a level of academic standing, they were lured into an offering with
a rate or pricing that they believed they had reason to be able to maintain,
only to find that when the situation changed, they were trapped into paying more. Credit card regulations changed quickly and dramatically
through private or public regulation, while law school merit scholarship
practices have changed a bit more slowly. By understanding the role of
culture and norms in bait-and-switch regulation, we can better comprehend the dynamics that drove those results. It might also help instruct aggrieved law students about what they should do to realize any further reforms they seek from law schools.
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1. Credit Card Regulation
Credit cards emerged in primitive form in the 1920s, 316 but John C.
Biggins, an enterprising executive at the Flatbush National Bank of Brooklyn, receives credit for inventing the modern card in 1947.317 By 1958,
American Express would issue its first piece of plastic.318 As banks began to
coalesce around Master Charge and BankAmericard during the 1960s, credit cards proliferated, with 29 million Americans having used a bank card on
at least one occasion.319 By 2008, roughly 177 million Americans would
carry credit cards, constituting nearly eighty percent of consumers.320
Until 2009, however, banks were able to engage freely in certain credit
card practices that can be labeled colloquially as “bait and switch.” During
the sixty years prior to the passage of the CARD Act,321 banks could increase rates on customer balances with little notice,322 for hair-trigger customer missteps, 323 and could revoke introductory and promotional rates
quickly.324 Through the CARD Act, Congress bluntly impaired the ability
of banks to use teasers or to bait-and-switch.325
In light of these manifold social welfare justifications, why did it take
decades for Congress suddenly to curtail these practices? The economic
rationale for the CARD Act was that before the regulatory intervention,
banks misled consumers into a welfare-reducing transactional experience
that was unanticipated at the time they entered into the credit card agreement. The distributive-based justification rests in the notion that those in
316

Lauren Bielski, Eight Tech Innovations That Took Banking into the 21st Century,
A.B.A. BANKING J. 87–88 (Nov. 2008).
317
LEWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY 26 (1990).
318
Ben Woolsey & Matt Schulz, Credit Card Statistics, Industry Facts, Debt Statistic:
History, CREDITCARDS.COM, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-in
dustry-facts-personal-debt-statistics-1276.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
319
JOSEPH NOCERA, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: HOW THE MIDDLE CLASS JOINED THE
MONEYED CLASS 62 (1994).
320
KEVIN FOSTER ET AL., THE 2008 SURVEY OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON 56 (2010), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/pp
dp/2009/ppdp0910.pdf.
321
See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734, 1735 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
322
See § 101(a), 123 Stat. at 1736–37.
323
An example of a misstep is the consumer’s failure to make the minimum payment
within sixty days of the due date. See § 101(b), 123 Stat. at 1736–37.
324
See § 101(b), 123 Stat. at 1738 (adding limits on introductory and promotional rates).
325
See Credit Card Accountability and Disclosure Act of 2009. The Federal Trade
Commission has its own guidance on “bait” within its jurisdiction. See 16 C.F.R. § 238
(2012). Banks are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency and the states.
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financial difficulty are affected more deeply than others when the balance
rate suddenly changes.326 These economic justifications for regulation existed for many years, but the justifications became more visible during the
onset of a financial crisis.327
One question to address is whether a custom should naturally emerge
here, per Epstein’s model. In theory, custom should emerge more readily
in the routinized world of credit transactions. Credit cards were commonly
used by 2008.328 To the extent there was asymmetry prior to 2008, consumers were shopping with credit cards without factoring in the probability of events that would lead to rate hikes. When banks accumulated more
leverage over individual consumers and were perceived to abuse their
power over consumers, the custom failed, and a new set of norms led to
the change in the law.
The sudden change in bait-and-switch regulation with consumer credit
cards was rooted in the sudden cultural storm and populist revolt that accompanied the financial crisis. When the consumer economy was strong,
the tactics employed by the banks might not have proven as visible or
broadly impactful. However, trust in public institutions tends to be shaken
by business cycle events.329 According to Gallup, the number of Americans saying “they have a great deal/quite a lot” of confidence in banks cratered from fifty-three percent in 2004 to twenty-three percent in 2009.330
By early 2009, an unmistakable political and social wave overwhelmed
the established customs of retail banking and its regulation—the dramatic
new norm drove a political effort to tighten controls on the financial sector,

326

People facing employment difficulty are more likely to be late on payments, as one
would expect. See Saskia Scholtes, Credit Card Delinquencies Climb to Record While
Loan Write-Offs Soar, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2325260c-f
326-11dd-abe6-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz27pPg3uzX. Access requires subscription.
327
By early 2009, while the CARD Act was being passed, the depth of the global
crisis was apparent. The International Monetary Fund deemed the slowdown, “the
deepest post-World War II recession by far.” WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK APRIL 2009:
CRISIS AND RECOVERY, INT’L MONETARY FUND xii (2009), http://www.imf.org/external
/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf. The year 2009 witnessed a thirty-two percent increase
in consumer bankruptcy filings. News Release, Total Bankruptcy Filings Increase 32
Percent in 2009, Approach Pre-BAPCPA Levels, American Bankruptcy Institute (Mar. 2,
2010), available at http://www.abiworld.org/e-news/PRESSRELEASE4Q2010stats.pdf.
328
FOSTER ET AL., supra note 320, at 56.
329
See generally Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Trust in Public Institutions Over
the Business Cycle 101 AM. ECON. REV. 281 (2011).
330
Dennis Jacobe, Americans’ Confidence in Banks Falls to Record Low, GALLUP
ECON. (June 27, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155357/Americans-Confidence-Banks
-Falls-Record-Low.aspx.
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particularly in the face of a deep recession.331 The CARD Act was part of
this effort. Before the 2008 financial crisis, over half the public expressed
confidence in banks, muffling any clarion call for regulating banking behavior. When public confidence in banks dropped through the floor, the
political system absorbed the cultural change and, among a slew of other
reforms, 332 cracked down on particular bait-and-switch-like practices in
the credit card banking sector. These practices had accumulated over time
but were shaken loose by this shift.
The CARD Act emerged from a scenario where culture and economic
welfare interests suddenly aligned, but after a major cultural shock.333 In
the end, cultural change motivated regulatory driven changes in industry
custom—changes that may have aligned with consumers having more certainty about their credit card agreements and fewer surprises. Even if the
practice did drive up rates, at the very least, consumers would have more
certainty about their offering because it was less confusing. That alone
could enhance welfare.
In many ways, the credit card changes reinforce the observations that
emerged in the retail grocery bait-and-switch regulation. The initial regulation of bait and switch in retail grocery regulation was driven by the political wave of the War on Poverty, according to the FTC report that
helped to inform the change.334 The loosening of the grocery store rules
occurred in an era where a wave of deregulation pulled the regulation
back. Both retail-grocery rule changes relied on economic studies, but the
substance of the studies reflected political culture intersecting with custom. Here, the credit card changes reflected the fact that consumers were
hurt more when the economy slowed down sharply.
331

A vast amount of literature, academic and popular, supports this observation. For
accessible examples, see Roger D. Congleton, On the Political Economy of the Financial Crisis
and Bailout of 2008, 140 PUB. CHOICE 287, 312–13 (2009), available at http://link.springer
.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11127-009-9478-z. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE
NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010).
332
The dominant legislative response to the cultural and political shift was encompassed in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
333
Some have subsequently found a downside economic impact of the CARD Act.
See, e.g., Curtis Arnold, CARD Act May Have Cost Consumers Billions, FORBES (Feb.
21, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2012/02/21/card-act-may-have-cos
t-consumers-billions/. Others, led by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, have
detailed the upside. See CARD Act Factsheet, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU
(Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/credit-card-act/feb2011
-factsheet/. The economics, whatever they may be now, appear to be apart from the cultural conversation about this part of the market.
334
See generally ECONOMIC REPORT ON FOOD CHAIN SELLING, supra note 33.
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2. Law School Merit Scholarships
Law school merit scholarships illustrate a potential difference between
traditional bait and switch and teasers. Golden Gate University Law
School,335 for example, may certainly have deployed merit scholarships to
compete for better students336 with the lure of discounted first-year tuition
and the promise that continued academic merit would ensure the continued
discount. 337 Disclosure of the basic conditions of scholarship retention
renders unclear the notion of whether Golden Gate’s practices would meet
traditional definitions of deception or insincerity.
In 2011, law students contended that they were not receiving what they
had bargained for when they matriculated at Golden Gate—and that sunk
costs were keeping them in a position where they had to pay full tuition for
their remaining two years if they did not retain their scholarships.338 Further,
some of them observed that law schools “offer more scholarships than [they]
plan[] to renew,” which they deemed an insincere approach, even with disclosures that the scholarship must be earned to be retained in future years.339
Before the ABA reformed law school scholarship rules in August,
2012,340 merit scholarships involved a truthful but limited disclosure to a
sophisticated group of consumers who remained prone to the optimism bias.341 Generally, the disclosure pre-2012 focused on the conditional nature
of the scholarship, specifically that the scholarship could only be retained
after the first year if specific academic standards (grade point averages
(GPAs)) were satisfied. The actual aggregate GPA distributions were not as
clear, and a student might not be able to assess the likelihood of retaining
the scholarship without that information. Further, the scholarship recipient
335

I only single out Golden Gate Law School and its students because of their prominence
in the New York Times article referenced supra note 1. Segal, supra note 1, at BU1. Certainly,
other law students and other institutions have faced the very same issue and controversy.
336
A law school may compete for better students to improve U.S. News & World Report
rankings. Merit scholarships induce students with high LSAT and grade points to matriculate, boosting the school’s position in the U.S. News formula. See Jerome Organ, How
Scholarship Programs Impact Students and the Culture of Law School, 61 J. L. EDUC. 173,
176 (2011). Another advantage of enrolling students with better profiles may be the true
institutional benefit of having an academically stronger student body.
337
See Segal, supra note 1, at BU6.
338
See id.
339
See id. at BU1.
340
See Standard 509(e), supra note 1.
341
The optimism bias reflects the irrational belief that a negative event is less likely to
happen to oneself than to others. See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions
Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 337 (2002).
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might have an unwarranted belief that a merit scholarship would indicate
that the school had absolute confidence in the student’s ability to succeed
and surpass the GPA threshold.342
The critical part of the 2012 reform is the requirement that schools publicly disclose scholarship retention on the school website and distribute the information to all receiving a conditional scholarship.343 Even with this additional disclosure, however, students may still find themselves prone to the
optimism bias, and feel like the pricing of their education was “switched”
dramatically, if their GPAs did not meet the specified standard. Only an outright ban on conditional scholarships would fully eliminate this phenomenon.
The alternative to a merit scholarship regime does not necessarily increase welfare or accrue to the benefit of students. No matter how the analysis
is sliced, the merit scholarship marketing tactic is ultimately a form of price
competition for matriculants. 344 Moreover, if law schools agreed not to
compete on net price, they could be susceptible to an antitrust challenge;345
welfare would be affected in an unpredictable way.346
If all merit scholarships are banned, or even if merit offerings are dampened by the recent standards change, law school net revenue might be unaffected. Would schools then charge the same net tuition to all students, regardless of
merit? Would schools shift more toward investing in guaranteed scholarships to
support needs-based admission? Or would schools invest the resources in faculty salaries or facilities development? One can only speculate.
The dynamics of competition for the law school matriculant—a competition that might accelerate in a market where applicant numbers are dropping347—could have profound and broader effects than one might anticipate.
The remedy that the Golden Gate Law School students are seeking through
342

See Segal, supra note 1, at BU1.
Standard 509(e), supra note 1.
344
See Chelsea Phipps, Law Schools Bargain with Students to Fill Seats, WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (Jul. 30, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/07/30/law-schools-bargai
n-with-students-to-fill-seats/ (describing the competitive market for law students, the role of
scholarships in competition for the students, and the magnitude of the growth of scholarship
allocations over the past decade).
345
The closest analogue to such a challenge involved the FTC’s investigation of the
collusion of undergraduate schools on fixing needs-based scholarship awards. For a summary
of the action, which led to a settlement in the form of a consent decree, but continued to be
litigated by one defendant, see United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir. 1993).
346
See generally Caroline M. Hoxby, Benevolent Colluders? The Effects of Antitrust
Action on College Financial Aid and Tuition, at ii (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7754, 2000) (discussing the ambiguous effect of eliminating collusion
among elite colleges on needs-based financial aid).
347
See LSAC Resources, LSAC, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/three-year-vol
ume.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
343
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the ABA accreditation process, the legislative process, and civil redress,
might have any number of unintended reverberations. The “sticker price”
for tuition might drop for all students, but for merit students, it is possible
that “meritocracy” in the form of financial reward would erode. Would
this advance welfare? Would it enhance student capture of welfare?
The ultimate outcome here should reflect the nature and dynamics of
the culture and custom more than welfare. As Epstein would predict, custom does not emerge to define roles well. A legal education is a one-time,
big-ticket purchase (low frequency, high severity) with asymmetric positioning of buyer and seller. 348 This dynamic might explain the Golden
Gate law students’ surprise. In a custom “vacuum,” surprises like the loss
of big-ticket scholarships emerge. Presumably, the extended campaign of
the students may have generated pressure where there was a cultural vacuum, leading to modest reform.
Law students have indeed begun to find regulatory traction and achieve
reform on this scholarship issue, and may find more gains in other areas.349 This reform effort took a great deal of time, even in the face of a crisis, possibly because it was challenging to obtain substantial cultural sympathy toward the plight of future lawyers. If culture drives regulation,
there was only a weak culture backing reform of law school merit scholarship practices, even if other practices were under tighter scrutiny.350
Though there were some exchanges between elected officials and the
ABA,351 and now some mild disclosure reform, it does not appear that
law students have broadly shocked the public conscience—or permeated
348

Although a law school arguably has incentive to maintain long-term good relations
with students and alumni post-transaction.
349
Projects like Law School Transparency are attempting to gain traction in a lot of
areas, most notably employment statistics reporting. See LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY,
http://www.lawschooltransparency.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). The rest of Standard
509 requires more law school “consumer disclosure,” especially in the area of employment.
See Standard 509(e), supra note 1.
350
Although the arguments about transparency about law school employment and
other transparency has received substantial attention. For a scholarly view, see generally
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
351
The concern from Congress about merit scholarships has been bipartisan. U.S. Sen.
Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and U.S. Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-IA) asked the ABA to
respond to the merit scholarship issue raised in the New York Times. See Letter from
Barbara Boxer to Stephen N. Zack, President of the American Bar Association (May 20,
2011), http://boxer.senate.gov/en/press/releases/052011.cfm (questioning gaps in ABA’s
law school statistical reporting); see also Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to
Stephen N. Zack (Jul. 11, 2011), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/2011-07-11
-Grassley-to-ABA.pdf (inquiring about law school accreditation and merit scholarships,
among other accreditation issues).
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regulatory consciousness—in the same way that the treatment of lowincome consumers, or the victims of crafty aluminum siding salesmen, or
sleazy retailers have.352 The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Education have been absent from the law school scene. As noted,
private litigation may prove to be the ultimate vehicle to seek remedy and
provide the publicity to drive change.353 Public statements of the legal advocates involved in class actions have certainly been strong, but such a
message has yet to achieve tangible results in a courtroom or beyond.354
To conclude the merit scholarship analysis, the law students who lose
these scholarships may indeed feel they were baited. This could certainly
feel akin to having a low credit card rate on a large balance suddenly rise
for an unanticipated but foreseeable reason. In both cases, exposure to disclosure, even the enhanced disclosure brought about in 2012, might have
limited effect.355 The impact of being switched to a high rate on a credit
352

The ABA changed its posture somewhat when it promulgated the new standard.
Originally, in a response memorandum to Senator Grassley, the ABA had maintained that
“the issue with merit scholarship retention is not based on any ‘bait-and-switch’ intention
by law schools, but arises because of the affected students’ failure to maintain the
required grade point average or class rank.” Bruce Buckley, A Scholarship Bait and
Switch?, THE NATIONAL JURIST (Sept. 2011) at 16. The ABA noted that students had
prior notice about scholarship retention guidelines, and further pointed out that in the
aggregate, the number of scholarship recipients and allocated dollars had risen.
Memorandum from the Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar to Senator
Charles E. Grassley, ABA (July 20, 2011). From 2005 to 2010, scholarship recipients
increased from 60,000 students to 69,000 students, while scholarship dollars increased
sixty-seven percent. Id. at 2. Concededly, this is simply the ABA’s report. Further
analysis might yield more nuances about these numbers. Again, the point is that the law
students have struggled to capture the cultural high ground required on this issue to take
on the legal education industry.
353
See Staci Zaretsky, Calling All Disgruntled Law School Graduates: Will You Ring in
the New Year by Suing Your School?, ABOVE THE LAW (Dec. 14, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://
abovethelaw.com/2011/12/calling-all-disgruntled-law-school-graduates-will-you-ring-in-the
-new-year-by-suing-your-school/.
354
Plaintiffs’ attorney David Anziska said, “These law schools are using a Nuremburg
defense. In the law, this isn’t a valid defense. When they try to make this argument saying,
‘[O]h, everyone else does it,’ it’s just an absurd argument.” Id. Whether this rhetoric will
spark the cause or overstate it remains to be seen.
355
See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (arguing that widespread mandatory disclosure
has failed to protect consumers and may cause harm); Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings,
Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994) (arguing marginal
information can prove insufficient to overcome the optimism bias). For the challenge
presented by consumer optimism in the credit card context, see Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by
Plastic, 98 N.W. U. L. REV. 1373, 1375–76 (2004) (discussing the consumer’s optimism
bias or estimation difficulties in the context of credit cards). Consumers tend to underestimate
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card can be costly, even financially devastating, just as failing to renew a
scholarship can be. Though some have filed lawsuits, 356 raised questions,357 or called for specific action358 about regulating law school admissions and financial aid practices that have the “feel” of bait and switch,
only modest reform in the nature of disclosure has resulted.359 This stands
in sharp contrast to what happened with credit card regulation.
Custom and norms may serve to explain more crisply why law school
merit scholarships have not historically been closely regulated, as opposed
to credit card rate switches.360 Free offers may fall into the same trap—the
economics are ambiguous at best, but the custom is cemented. The prescription for the perpetually churning group of law students in this position would be to find a way to lobby on a sustained basis to change the
culture of the commerce of legal education—or perhaps to aim more

the probability and impact of a negative event causing unfavorable triggers to their
balances; in the law school context, the blogosphere has offered a debate about merit
scholarships, bait and switch, and disclosure. See Jeff Lipshaw, The Irony of Requiring
Meritorious Performance to Maintain a Law School Merit Scholarship, LEGAL PROF. BLOG
(May 1, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2011/05/the-irony-of
-requiring-meritorious-performance-to-maintain-a-law-school-merit-scholarship.html (expressing skepticism about the effectiveness of disclosure on the cognitive biases of students). Cf.
Proposing a New Standard to Require Scholarship Retention, LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY
BLOG (Apr. 30, 2011, 9:27 PM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2011/04/propos
ing-a-new-standard-to-require-scholarship-retention-information/ (offering proposed standards of disclosure for law schools in light of the author’s observation that “[i]ssues arise
... when the combination of opaque grading curves and conditions bound to that curve
obfuscate the meaning of the terms and limit a prospective [student]’s ability to understand
the expected value of [a merit] scholarship”).
356
See Class Action Complaint, supra note 26, at 2–4.
357
See, e.g., Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-IA), supra note 351; see also
Letter from Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA), supra note 351.
358
See, e.g., Proposing a New Standard to Require Scholarship Retention, supra note 355.
359
In this Article, I am neutral about the normative outcome of the merit scholarship debate.
I merely seek to briefly describe the nature of the debate and explain the potential outcome.
360
Though it is tempting to explain the difference by pointing to the powerful
accreditation tandem of the American Bar Association and the American Association of
Law Schools, the influence of the law school education interests pales in comparison to the
power of banking interests. For one recent political assessment, see, e.g., Paul Blumenthal
& Dan Froomkin, Auction 2012: How the Bank Lobby Owns Washington, HUFF POST
POLITICS (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/30/auction-2012-bank
s-lobby-washington_n_1240762.html (quoting Georgetown Law Professor Adam Levitin,
“They make an awful lot of campaign contributions .... They aren’t making those just out of
the goodness of their heart. They’re hoping that it gets them some influence. It certainly gets
them an audience at the very least ... I think it’s hard for your average citizen to understand the
intensity of lobbying of both people on the Hill and in government agencies.”).
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broadly to address developing issues in the commercial structure of all
higher education.361
D. “Lawful” Bait and Switch
Many common marketing, advertising, and sales practices land just on
the other side of lawfulness from traditional bait and switch. Exploring
briefly why these common practices are lawful can also inform the weighing of the role of customs and norms.
“Lawful” bait and switch occurs with abundance. Virtually every flavor
of retail environment consumers enter, physically and virtually, is designed
to steer and route consumers to switch to buying more things or a more
profitable item.362 The walk through a supermarket to buy milk in the back
aisle, through a maze of aisles and displays,363 is a walk that could have
been engineered by the designer of a Las Vegas casino.364 The search for a
book on an online store produces one-click icons to buy other books, presumably to lure the consumer to buy more inventory.365
A sales clerk might suggest that a customer try on a certain article of
clothing first in order to contrast it subsequently against the article the
store would really like to sell. Does this first “try-this-shirt-on” effort reflect the “sincerity” that the FTC seeks in assessing whether activity
amounts to bait and switch? This instance shows that sincerity is a matter
of degree, a matter of practicality—and a matter of custom. If the store is
willing to sell that first item, that seems to obviate the need for inquiring

361

These large issues abound and could become the focus of a broader populist-driven
change in the commercial relationship between parents, students, and institutions of higher
education. See, e.g., ANDREW DELBANCO, COLLEGE: WHAT IT WAS, IS, AND SHOULD BE
121–22 (2012) (warning that four-year liberal arts education is becoming available only to
the very wealthy and that this phenomenon is unhealthy to American democracy).
362
See PATRICK M. DUNNE ET AL., RETAILING 485 (2008).
363
See Arnold Anderson, Retail Layout Strategies, CHRON.COM, http://smallbusiness
.chron.com/retail-layout-strategies-11464.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“The layout
of aisles should be a horseshoe design that brings customers through the front door with
impulse products and some high-demand items, works customers to the back of the store
with higher-priced items and then allows them to exit through aisles of more impulse
items at the cash register locations.”).
364
See Jonah Lehrer, The Psychology of Casinos, WIRED (Mar. 31, 2012), http://www
.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/03/the-psychology-of-casinos/.
365
For Amazon.com’s patent on technology that pushes advertisements for sale of other
books the customer might like, see United States Patent No. 7,113,917 B2, GOOGLE
PATENTS (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.google.com/patents?id=dtp6AAAAEB
AJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4&source=gbs_overview_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.
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about sincerity. The law does not require sincerity to rise to the level of
insisting that the seller have equal enthusiasm for selling each of its wares.
Custom dictates that the marketplace expects some degree of mild
bait-and-switch activity from retailers and custom influences the fact that
this activity is lawful. Showing a customer one item to encourage the purchase of another, physically guiding a customer by an impulse-buy item
on the way to a planned purchase, using a free offer—it all synchronizes
within our norms, custom, and culture. Regulating this type of behavior
would prove impossible, if not unthinkable, and would prove inconsistent
with the FTC’s stated aspiration not to unduly burden commercial activity.366 In fact, generating these consumer transactions likely would produce
the very exchanges that will advance welfare. Deception, in the spirit of
section 5 of the FTC Act, does not really prowl near.367
Even though permitting these tactics puts the seller at some advantage,
the tactics are within a familiar boundary of our culture and do not involve
undue pressure. The symmetry between buyer and seller in most retail environments,368 and the ability to shop elsewhere with ease, reduces the impact
of the sunk cost fallacy and involves low transaction costs that enable the
consumer to escape.
In many bait-and-switch environments that are culturally unacceptable,
the consumer has difficulty escaping because of the sunk cost fallacy or the
absence of retailer choice. In those that are acceptable, like free offers, the
consumer has comparatively more choice.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A broad look at bait-and-switch practices reveals findings both about
the regulatory approach to bait and switch and potentially for regulation
generally. As I have described in detail and with specificity, custom and
norms explain the orientation of the regulatory approach much more than
welfare advancement. This same phenomenon can be observed in the
drafting of the UCC and even in the development of torts jurisprudence.
For “traditional” bait and switch, the cultural custom and norms are reinforced through the regulatory approach. The anti-deception mandate in section 5 of the FTC Act rejects insincere offers designed to switch consumers

366

See About the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 9.
Federal Trade Commission Act, Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719–24 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)).
368
Low-income area retailers should always be scrutinized, as the case studies in Part
III demonstrate.
367
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to other products.369 This aligns with welfare advancement, as transactions
that are a byproduct of deception from the seller can destroy utility for the
buyer and generate general distrust in the market. The regulatory disfavor
for traditional bait and switch prevents a race to the bottom that would
immerse the consumer in a marketplace of sharks. A market where traditional bait and switch prevails could function if consumers were on their
guard. Perhaps such a market could function well in cultures that embrace
aggressive haggling as part of the transactional process—but not in the
American market culture.
Similarly, culture dominates in guiding permissive “free offer” regulation—as the tactic can confuse consumers, cause cognitive error, and destroy welfare. Some have argued that the tactic is inherently misleading.370
Nonetheless, the centuries-old tradition continues because it is deeply embedded in our commercial culture. Moving further on the spectrum, retail
grocers were able to use promotions with almost no accountability until
the culture changed in the 1960s, when the FTC promulgated special
guidelines for the industry.371 By the 1980s, the larger regulatory culture
had taken a dramatic political turn, and the guidelines were significantly
weakened.372 Today, grocers have more room to aggressively deploy special deals to lure consumers than other retailers. Economics were used to
explain both regulatory turns, but the thematic culture (attacking poverty
in the 1960s and “paperwork” in the 1980s) played the dominant factor.
In the Introduction, I noted the hunting metaphor employed by the law
student quoted in the New York Times article. As applied to sales and marketing, when is hunting fair sport? When is it an unfair “turkey shoot”? The
cultural viewpoint on credit cards shifted, driving regulation that would prevent unfair manipulation of interest rates. The banks’ “hunting practices”
with the use of low introductory rates as traps were no longer viewed as fair
sport, but rather as a turkey shoot. Large numbers of trapped consumers fell
victim373 to the banks’ hunting practices, to follow the metaphor leading
Congress to intervene. With the law school merit scholarships, perhaps the
369

See FTC § 5, 38 Stat. at 719–20.
Namely, Commissioner James Mead and the consumer advocacy groups have
argued the tactic is misleading.
371
Robert Pitofsky et al., Pricing Laws Are No Bargain for Consumers, ANTITRUST
MAG., Summer 2004, at 62, available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents
/Article-Pricing_Laws(7-04).pdf.
372
Id. at 63.
373
The thirty-day credit card delinquency rate almost doubled during the period
between May 2005 and February 2009, from 3.56% to 6.61%. Historical Credit Card
Interest Rates, CARD HUB, http://www.cardhub.com/edu/historical-credit-card-interest-rates/
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
370
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law students need to make (or continue to make) more strenuous efforts to
convince Congress and regulators that they are part of the turkey shoot, victims of unfair hunting practices.374
If the change in culture necessary for achieving regulatory reform requires the public to have empathy for law school graduates, it might be hard
to achieve basic reforms. To the public at large, law school graduates, particularly those who were awarded scholarships, might not be the most compelling poster child for reform in a weak economy. Although this dynamic
stands completely apart from the moral merits of the law students’ position
and fails to invoke welfare arguments, it may help explain the difficulty students are finding achieving reform of scholarship practices outside of challenges through class action lawsuits.
For regulatory change advocates, the broadest prescription one can
make would be to control and influence the cultural dialogue. Arguments
invoking welfare advancement do matter, and perhaps ideally should have
primacy for the regulator. But for advocates, all such welfare arguments
should always be couched within a cultural context. One can look beyond
the sphere of commercial arguments to see these arguments at work. For
one current example that may shed some final light on the previously described commercial dynamics, consider government regulation of marriage. Social norms have played a key role in preserving the status quo375
and in obstructing376 and driving change.377 The same forces of culture are
at work in bait and switch, but with entirely different stakes.
Ultimately, in scenarios that are on the margin, policymakers face a difficult choice. In scenarios where welfare might not be advanced by regulation, would regulation be worth the cost? Other factors that policymakers
might consider could include whether the regulation would mitigate harsh
distributional outcomes, or whether the regulation, in reflecting a more
374

Lawsuits may provide a way to force the outcome sooner, both in terms of relief
and publicity, but the risk of loss may yield a permanent setback.
375
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86
VA. L. REV. 1901, 1903–05 (2000).
376
See Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COL. J.
GENDER & L. 236, 238 (2006).
377
See Religion and Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage, PEW FORUM (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.pewforum.org/Gay-Marriage-and-Homosexuality/Religion-and-Attitudes-Toward
-Same-Sex-Marriage.aspx (“The public has gradually become more supportive of granting
legal recognition to same-sex marriages over the past 15 years, with support increasing more
steeply in recent years.”). Eight states currently recognize or will recognize same-sex marriage. See Kenneth Chamberlain, MAP: Where Is Same-Sex Marriage Legal, NAT’L J. (May
9, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/map-where-is-same-sex-marriage-legal
--20120509.
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“honorable” norm, might enhance confidence in the marketplace. Political
expedience might pull regulators toward adopting the popular norm, but social costs should be carefully considered before so doing.
CONCLUSION
Bait-and-switch regulation provides an informative illustration for understanding the larger picture of the role of culture, norms, and custom in
consumer regulation. Welfare arguments may carry some weight in regulation and may incidentally coincide with the interests driven by norms.
But it is clear that culture, norms, and custom come first. If the purpose of
regulation is to advance welfare, perhaps regulators should start with the
premise that the power of culture generally has primacy.
This discovery about bait and switch should serve as a cautionary tale
to lawmakers and regulators to ensure that they are restricting and permitting marketplace behavior for the proper reasons. Additionally, this observation should serve as a guide to those lobbying for tighter regulation, like
the law school students, and for those lobbying for looser regulation, like
the retail grocers, who managed successfully to communicate a change in
norms using the economic ethos of the day.
In sum, in this corner of the commercial arena, culture, norms, and
customs will generally predict the nature of regulation. In the commercial
regulatory zones, the same broad guidance should apply.

